Satellite servicing economic study by unknown
VINV8V'IV '3"I'ilASANNH
1:131N30 1HDI'I=I 30VdS "i-IVHSI:IVIN VSVN
aql JO-I
e!uJO;!leO 'o|lV Oled
7VI::IO'I/SIN=IISAS =IOVdS
1_8 ua_ielJaPUl'l
_$,LSg-SSVN 'JaquJnN DeJ_,uoo
066L 'JaquJaoaQ
!/
_ii! c
/i
:_,
• _:i .......
? ....
_,-: i;
i ,i
: iii! ;ii
_i!ii <'.
, y
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910009850 2020-03-19T18:49:17+00:00Z

December, 1990
Contract Number, NAS8-38142
Undertaken By
SPACE SYSTEMS/LORAL *
Palo Alto, California
For The
NASA MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
* Formerly Ford Aerospace Corporation
SPACE SYSTEMS/ Limiting!--
ACRONYM LIST
AXAF
C&DH
CSSO
DMS
DMSP
DRM.
ELV
EOS
EP
ESS
EUVE
EVA
FSS
FTS
GPBS
GSE
lOSS
IVA
LCC
MACS
MMS
MPS
NR
Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
Command & data handling
Communication satellite systems operations
Data management system
Defence Meteorological Satellite Program
Design Reference Mission
Expendable launch vehicle
Earth Observation System
Explorer Platform
Expendable servicing system
Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer
External vehicular activity
Flight Support System
Flight Telerobotic Servicer
Geostationary Platform Bus Study
Ground support equipment
Integrated Orbital Servicing System
internal vehicular activity
life cycle cost
Modular attitude control system
Multi-mision Modular Spacecraft
Modular power system
Non recurring
ODC
OMV
ORU
OTV
P(s)
PED
POP
R
RMS
SADA
SATCAV
SSES
SSF
SSS
STS
TDRSS
WTR
XTE
Other direct charges
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
Orbital replacement unit
Orbital Transfer Vehicle
Probability of success
Platform equipment deck
Polar Orbiting Platform
Recurring
Remote Manipulator System
Solar array drive assembly
Stochastic space mission life cycle cost &
availability model
Satellite Servicing Economic Study
Space Station Freedom
Satellite servicing system
Space transportation system
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Western Test Range
X-Ray Timing Experiment
CONTENTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ _mU_dl_k.I.-
PAGE
m
Introduction and Background
Study Tasks
Study Ground Rules
SATCAV Model
Results Summary
Task 1: Review Data From Existing Studies
Task 2/Task 3: Analyze New Design Reference Missions (DRM)
1) Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF)
2) Polar Orbiting Platform (POP)
3) Explorer Platform (EP)
SSES Summary
5
7
9
13
15
17
43
47
105
133
173
3
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This study was initiated by MSFC, in an attempt to consolidate previous servicing studies into a
common database. In general, these studies have concluded that satellite servicing is a cost
effective solution over an expendable satellite. The potential benefit of a consistent database of
previous studies will provide a basis so that performance trends can be used when analyzing new
servicing missions.
Space Systems/Loral (formerly Ford Aerospace Corporation) was tasked with collecting and
reviewing the various program studies, and to apply the same methodology in an analysis of
currently planned and funded programs. This would provide an independent cost analysis of new
programs, and assess the overall life cycle cost benefits of servicing versus satellite replacement.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
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Previous studies have shown that satellite servicing
is cost effective
However, all of these studies were of different
formats, dollar year, learning rates, availability, etc.
It was difficult to correlate any useful trends from
these studies
This study was initiated to:
- Correlate the economic data from past studies into
a common data base, using a common set of
assumptions
- Analyze a select set of existing funded programs
to provide an independent analysis of the servicing
options and potential economic benefits
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STUDY TASKS
The goals of the study were to;
1. Review some of the previous servicing studies primarily as background data, and for life cycle
cost (LCC) comparisons. The following programs were evaluated during the study. The
Integrated Orbital Servicing System (lOSS), Spacecraft Assembly, Maintenance and
Servicing, Satellite Servicing Working Group Studies, FAC/NASA studies on the
Geostationary Platform Bus, Communication Satellite Systems Operations (CSSO) with the
Space Station study, the Geostationary Platform Bus Study (GPBS), and the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Block 6 study undertaken for the USAF. The data
presented in these studies was transposed to a common data base and the costs normalized
in 1989 dollars.
2. Develop new design reference missions (DRMs) that would be in place in the 1995 to 2010
time frame. The DRMs developed were for the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
(AXAF), the Polar Orbiting Platform (POPs), and the Explorer Platform. In general, four
basic missions were established: Expendable, Expendable Servicing, Shuttle Servicing and
Space Station Servicing. Shuttle and Space Station Servicing were not considered for the
POP.
3. To conduct (a) a normalizing of the economic data of the selected scenarios from existing
studies to produce life cycle costs (LCCs) and (b) economically analyzing the scenarios for
the new DRMs. From this data, parametric curves were produced showing the sensitivity
effects on the LCC by varying the satellite costs, reliability, servicer system cost and launch
costs.
STUDY TASKS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m a----_ • m
• Review previous servicing studies and generate a common
database normalized in 1989 dollars. Perform a life cycle cost
(LCC) analysis for comparison with previously generated results.
Develop new design reference missions (DRMs) in the 1995 to
2010 time frame. Examine the expendable satellite versus
serviceable satellite option scenarios.
Normalize the economic data for the selected expendable and
serviceable scenarios to generate life cycle cost data. Generate
parametric curves showing the sensitivity effects on the LCC by
varying satellite costs, reliability, servicer cost, and launch costs.
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STUDY GROUND RULES
The common financial base was established in 1989 dollars. Any input or derived costs were
escalated to FY89 dollars. The learning curve input was set at 100%, this was based on
experience with the INTELSAT V Program (a total of 15 satellites) and discussions with
NASA-MSFC on their experience with the Shuttle main engine program. The cost of money
was set at a 5% discount rate for LCC results.
A 10% uncertainty factor was assumed in all final result data for comparing the economic
benefit of servicing. This defined a confidence threshold in the results to establish when a
servicing benefit had been realized. This factor was generated by examining the correlation
data from Task 1, and from an estimate of the input data uncertainty for the Task2 DRMs
considered.
The baseline ground rule used to estimate Shuttle costs is based on a charge of $208M to
launch 56K Ibs to a nominal orbit of 160 nm, 28.5 ° inclination. This results in a $3714 per
pound. Then for the various missions, a table look-up is used to determine the capacity for
other than 160 nmi altitudes orbits, and a new dollar-per-pound factor is determined. The 33%
manifest charge is included for all Shuttle payloads if the weight and length of the payload do
not represent over 75% of the Shuttle capacity.
Space Station servicing related costs are mission dependant, but all payloads will require
handling, monitoring, integration and testing prior to the servicing mission. During the mission
staging period ORUs will be monitored by the Station Crew and it is expected that these
operations will require continuous support by the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Data
Management (DMS) and Communications subsystems. The servicing mission will require IVA
crew support, Remote Manipulator System (RMS) handling time, and possibly EVA. The cost
estimates include SSF Logistics Pallet Use $3,600/Ib; DMS Services $6,600/hr;
Communications Services $2,500/hr; RMS services $41,700/hr; EVA activity $123,000/hr; IVA
activity $19,000/h r.
STUDY GROUND RULES
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All costs are in 1989 dollars
Learning curve set at 100%
Cost of money set at 5%
A confidence threshold of 10% is used to evaluate the servicing benefit.
System availability will be held constant.
- Model will perform scheduled maintenance prior to failure
- Model will simulate random failures and perform maintenance on demand
Nominal Shuttle launch cost is $208M to 160 nm orbit
m
Space Station Freedom (SSF) user charges for servicing missions are
mission dependant, and vary between $10-30M It is assumed that the
servicing mission will require IVA and EVA crew support, Remote
Manipulator System (RMS) handling, and SSF support services during
payload integration and test.
Development costs of NASA servicing systems are paid by the NASA. A
user fee only is charged to each program
- Remote servicer user fee: $5M per mission
- OMV user fee: $6M per mission
- OTV user fee: $14.6M per mission plus fuel at $2100/kg
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STUDY ORGANIZATION
The study was undertaken within the Advanced Systems Group of Space Systems Division (SSD) with the
required support from the financial and contracts groups. Advanced Systems is a part of the Government
Space Operations, headed by Mr Glynn Armstrong. Mr Bill DeRoucher, with many years of experience in the
satellite servicing arena, was hired as a consultant primarily to undertake Task, 1 while Joel Greenberg,
founder of Princeton Synergetics, provided the resources to generate the financial outputs utilizing the
SATCAV computer model.
STUDY ORGANIZATION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • a-,,--m_ ,i... ----,
Study Manager ]John D=xson
I
_- Cost Analyst _ Mission Analysis
Princeton Synergetics Paul Russell
, (Joel Greenberg) David Pidgeon
L Financial Analysis " ]--Review of Existing Data
I--Mission Costing
LScenario Development/
Analysis
Mission Analysis ]
Bill DeRocher J
-Review of Existing Data
-Scenar,o Development/
Analysis
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SATCAV MODEL
SATCAV; a stochastic space mission life cycle cost & availability model was developed by
Princeton Synergetics, Princeton, NJ, and has been used as the prime analytical tool in this study
to generate program life cycle costs.
The model simulates launch and on-orbit operations associated with the initiation and continuing
operation of a generalized space mission comprising multiple satellites with a multiple sensor
capability. The model operates on an IBM PC microcomputer and utilizes a LOTUS 123 menu
driven input/output system to create a date-file that is accessed by a FORTRAN Monte Carlo
program that performs the computation.
SATCAV simulates satellite launch operations using expendable or recoverable launch vehicles
and upper stages and takes into account the consequences of a set of defined failures in terms
of cost incurring events and time delays. SATCAV simulates the random and wearout of a
multi-sensor satellite determining when specific failures occur and when maintenance actions are
required to respond to critical failures.
SATCAV encompasses alternative maintenance scenarios that include both ground and on-orbit
spares. Both launch on-failures and launch in-anticipation of wearout failure alternatives are
available. Different transportation scenarios may be selected for placement and maintenance
flights.
SATCAV also considers subjectively selected uncertainties and develops cost, event, and
availability statistics reports. It also develops a typical event timeline report.
SATCAV MODEL
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SATCAV stochastic space mission life cycle cost & availability
model =sihae prime analytical tool in this study to generate program life
cycle costs.
The model simulates launch and on-orbit operations of a multiple
satellite system with multiple sensor capability,
SATCAV simulates satellite launch operations using expendable or
recoverable launch vehicles and accounts for the consequences of a
set of defined failures in terms of cost incurring events and time
delays.
SATCAV simulates the random failures and wearout of a multi-sensor
satellite determining when specific failures occur and when
maintenance actions are required to respond to critical failures.
SATCAV also considers subjectively selected uncertainties and
develops cost, event, and availability statistics reports.
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• AXAF:
- All of the considered servicing scenarios showed to be cost effective
over the expendable AXAF scenario. The expendable servicing system
resulted in the lowest LCC
POP
- Platform servicing was not cost effective if total payload replacement is
a requirement. A modified servicing strategy was defined to investigate
when POP servicing would be cost effective.
EP
- The Expendable servicer demonstrated the lowest LCC. However, the
Expendable servicer, Shuttle based servicer (FSS), and the expendable
satellite scenarios were all within 5% in total LCC.
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TASK 1
REVIEW DATA FROM
EXISTING STUDIES
TASK 1 METHODOLOGY
A number of previous servicing studies were evaluated. As a basis for information two payload models were
utilized to formulate the candidate servicing scenario. These were the 1973 NASA Headquarters and the 1974
NASA-MSFC payload models. These two sources resulted in a combined 545 mission and 101 payload
programs. The 101 programs was reduced in the final count to 10. Having established the payload set the next
step was to escalate the spacecraft and operational cost into 1989 dollars for a direct comparison of the LCC
costs using the SATCAV model. Space Station costs were treated in a similar manner. Launch vehicle costs were
also updated to reflect the current charges.
The data was then transcribed into the format required for the SATCAV model using the above assumptions and
a number of test cases run. Once the inputs to the model for these test cases were refined and understood the
balance of the cases were run. The results of these SATCAV outputs were then directly compared to the original
study results normalized into 1989 dollars.
TASK 1 METHODOLOGY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m _._n J__ i_. m
• Data for spacecraft and associated operational and maintenance costs for
each mission analyzed were derived from previous studies
- Spacecraft and operational costs escalated to 1989 dollars
- Launch costs revised to reflect current launch vehicle charges
- Space Station charges escalated to 1989 dollars
• Data transcribed to SATCAV format using described assumptions
• Results of SATCAV outputs compared to original study to determine
similarities or differences
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lOSS MAINTENANCE APPLICABLE SET SELECTION
The following chart shows the selection logic in establishing the candidate payload set of spacecraft programs
that could be used to test the value of servicing. The two NASA payload models combined for a total 545
missions and 101 programs. Using the criteria of orbit, which deleted the planetary missions, schedule, which
deleted spacecraft in procurement, necessity, the need for servicing, data, sometimes only the program title
was available, costs, which deleted low cost programs, the model was reduced to 340 missions in 47
programs. This set was further refined using the criteria shown to obtain a characteristic set with 54 missions
in 6 programs. These six programs were used as the basis of representative conceptual designs and to
provide specifics on the range of design data needed for other lOSS analysis.
lOSS MAINTENANCE APPLICABLE SET SELECTION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ IF---__m'_L__ mm m
,,73P,,L°,°M °ELJTOT'L'OTOM'TEOIJULY 1974 SSPD SPACECRAFT PROGRAM 545 MISSIONS101 PROGRAMS
ORBIT -
SCHEDULE -
NECESSITY -
DATA -
COST -
CATEGORIZE DATA-
GROUP IN SETS-
SELECT SPACECRAFT
FOR MAINTENANCE
CONSIDERATIONS
J_,ml
:_qll
340 MISSIONS
47 PROGRAMS MAINTENANCE
APPLICABLE
SPACECRAFT
ESTABLISH MATRIX- DETERMINE 54 MISSIONS
CHARACTERISTIC
SELECT SPACECRAFT- SET 10 PROGRAMS
CHECK SET-
CHARACTERISTIC
SET
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THE SSES/IOSS MAINTENANCE SET
The next requirement was to reduce the 47 spacecraft programs of the lOSS maintenance set to the 10
programs of the SSES/IOSS maintenance applicable set. The main criteria was to identify programs where
servicing would be cost effective.
The first 5 spacecraft eliminated were spin stabilized to which the lOSS cannot dock. Spacecraft with a
recurring cost of less than $40M in 1975 dollars was the next selection criteria used as studies have shown
that servicing is unlikely to be cost effective on a low cost satellite. For the sane cost effectiveness reason,
satellites having a lifetime of less than 1 year were also eliminated. Programs with launch dates before 1980
or those whose mission were complete, and would, therefore, generate little or no interest, were dropped as
were one flight or duplicate missions. Finally, the remaining 15 programs were placed in order depending on
the model schedule launch date and the 5 earliest launch dates were deleted to bring the SSES/IOSS
maintenance applicable set to 10 programs. This was viewed to be a manageable number that adequately
spanned the range of orbital characteristics.
The chart identifies the 10 programs. The payload numbers are from the 1973 payload model and the
payload code from the 1974 payload model. The missions range from astrophysics, code AST, Earth
Physics, code PHY, and geosynchronous spacecraft, code NN/D (NN/D-14 is a LEO spacecraft).
THE SSES/IOSS MAINTENANCE SET
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10 Proqram Set
Payload
Number
HE-08-A
HE-10-A
SO-02-A
AS-16-A
HE-11A
AP-07-A
CN-53-A
CN-59-A
EO-59-A
OP-51 A
Payload
Code
AST-5B
AST-5C
AST-7
AST-8
AST-9A
PHY-3B
NN/D-2B
NN/D-6
NN/D-12
NN/D-14
Spacecraft Name
Large High Energy Observatory A
Large High Energy Observatory B
Large Solar Observatory
Large Radio Observatory A
Large High Energy Observatory D
Environmental Perturbation Satellite-B
Domsat B
Communications R&D Prototype
Geosynchronous Earth Resources Satellite
Global Earth And Ocean Monitoring System
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SPAN OF THE SSES/IOSS SET
The ability of the SSES/IOSS maintenance applicable set to cover the range of important servicing
characteristics (span of the set) is shown in this chart. The first characteristic of interest is the first launch
date which spans from 1982 to 1988. The original lOSS maintenance applicable set spanned from 1979 to
1988. The difference occurred in the way the SSES/IOSS set was selected in-house. The second
characteristic was orbit and the infrastructure required to attain it. For example, the Geosynchronous Earth
orbit (GEO) satellites require an OTV to get to the final orbit. Polar orbits were excluded in this phase of the
study since they were covered in Task2 with the POPs. The next characteristic was the satellite mass which
covered a range from 957 kg to 9510 kg. As previously mentioned, low mass, less expensive satellites were
eliminated during the SSES/IOSS set selection. However, the mass characteristic still covers a 10 to 1
range. The number of missions per satellite program in the SSES/IOSS span is from 2 to 14 as compared to
the lOSS span of 1 to 25. Note that the SSES/IOSS selection process deleted the one mission programs
and the 25 mission program was deleted because each mission's length was less than one year. The
on-orbit fleet size of the SSES/IOSS set is from 1 to 7 while the lOSS span went from 1 to 12. The satellite
program with 12 satellites on-orbit was deleted because of low satellite costs. The average lifetime for the
lOSS set was from 0.5 to 6 years while that of the SSES/IOSS set was from 1 to 6 years. As previously
stated, any program with less than one years life was disregarded.
The result of this is that the span of the SSES/IOSS set is more representative of spacecraft programs that
have a higher probability of being cost effective with servicing than were those in the broader span of the
lOSS set, which was intended to identify the bounds of cost effective servicing.
SPAN OF THE SSES/IOSS SET
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Payload First Mass Number On-Orbit Life-
Code Launch (kg) Of Fleet Time
m
AST-5B 86 Orbiter 8400 3 1 1
AST-5C 87 Orbit 5034 2 1 2
AST-7 85 Orbiter 9510 7 1 1
AST-8 85 Tug-LEO 997 4 1 2
AST-9A 82 Orbiter 6470 4 1 2
PHY-3B 87 Tug-LEO 3947 2 1 3
NN/D-2B 82 GEO 1472 14 7 6
NN/D-6 83 GEO 957 3 1 4
NN/D-12 88 GEO 1531 10 2 2
N N/D-14 86 Orbiter 1289 9 3 2
SESS/Low 82 Orbiter 957 2 1 1
SESS/High 88 GEO 9510 14 7 6
lOSS/Low 79 Orbiter 141 1 1 0,5
lOSS/High 88 Polar 9731 25 12 6
25
SPAN OF THE SSES/IOSS SET
(Continued)
No Text
SPAN OF THE SSES/IOSS SET
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • - a--,,_m__i _
Mission Orbit Mass (kg) Constellation Lifetime (Years)
CSSO
GPBS
Military METSAT
Military METSAT
GEO
GEO
SSO
GEO
1335 2 10
5040 3 10
850 2 5
905 1 5
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SPACECRAFT & SERVICER COST ESTIMATES
Spacecraft cost data were not listed in the lOSS published documentation as NASA had provided the cost data
and felt that their release might compromise future procurement of the spacecraft. While these cost data may
well be in NASA or Martin Marietta files, the difficulty in finding them was judged to be high. It was therefore
decided to try and back out the cost numbers out of the the expendable program costs, which were given in the
lOSS documentation in 1975 dollars. The process followed is presented in the chart.
The expendable spacecraft equation involves 10 parameters plus the total. Each of these parameters is
discussed and the approach to their quantification. Cost figures were obtained from the Integrated Orbital
Servicing Study for Low Cost Payload Programs, Final Report, Volume II, Technical and Analysis, MCR-75-310,
September, 1975, issued by the Martin Marietta Corporation, Denver, CO. The approach identified each cost
component, or established a ratio between the cost component and the spacecraft recurring cost, thus leaving
the recurring cost as the only unknown. Spacecraft recurring cost was assumed to be 5 times the spacecraft
unit cost based on previous cost estimating ratios. The number of spacecraft were considered as was the loss
factor during implacement. The next parameter was the ratio of launch check-out to spacecraft cost, taken in
this case as 9%. Another parameter is the cost of sustaining engineering made up of three products, the cost
per man year (40K in $1975), the number of personnel retained for the recurring engineering, in this case 22 to
90. It was then necessary to estimate the number of personnel for each spacecraft program. This was
calculated by estimating the spacecraft annual cost for each program. The largest annual space craft cost was
divided by 90 to obtain a high ratio and the lowest cost divided by 22 to get a low ratio. The average ratio was
then calculated. This average was then used with the annual cost to determine the number sustaining people
for each program. The third factor in the product is the number of years that sustaining engineering is required.
The next parameter is the launch cost sharing factor for the orbiter This factor must also be divided by 0.75 if
the payload does not occupy more than 75% of the shuttle bay to account for manifesting because the orbiter
will not be fully loaded. Orbiter launch costs must also be plugged into the equation. These were taken as $12M
in 1975 dollars. Other parameters considered were the cost of the tug (OTV) at $1.1 M in $1975, a 0.85 tug user
factor and the tug launch cost.
The servicer cost estimate was obtained from the 1975 lOSS Final Report and the final Final Report released
in 1978. The second report was an effort to assure that nothing had been overlooked and emphasized
operational costs. The first analysis used analogies to similar type manipulator systems to establish equipment
costs on the basis of mass. Non-recurring costs were based on Martin Marietta's historical data. Three servicer
units were produced, 2 for the East coast and 1 for the West coast. Spares included the equivalent of 3.5 units.
Operations cost included 12 years at the ETR and 9 years at the WTR. All these inputs were then updated to
1989 dollars using inflation ratios provided by NASA-MSFC.
SPACECRAFT & SERVICER COST ESTIMATES
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __m_ • m
• Spacecraft costs not explicit in lOSS documentation
• Worked backwards from expendable spacecraft program
• Cost equation
• Expendable program cost values are documented
• Orbiter cost values are documented
• Tug cost values are documented
• Sustaining engineering
- Used given range of 22 to 90 man levels to establish ratio to annual spacecraft program cost
- Man year cost at $40K
- All other factors documented
• DDT&E to spacecraft unit cost ratio taken at 5
• Solved for spacecraft unit cost
• Solved for spacecraft DDT&E cost
• Used the lOSS ratios to serviceable spacecraft costs
• Servicer cost used data from first and second lOSS studies
- Used analogies to similar systems and ratios for project engineering and management
- Spares, logistics, ground support, facilities, and ops. site services included
- DDT&E $29M $1975 ($35M $1977), Unit cost $1.8M ($2.2M $1977), Ops. $56.1M $1975 ($68.2M
$1977)
• Second analysis as check emphasized operations costs
- DDT&E $37.3M $1977, Unit cost $2.1M $1977_)ps. (75% mission model) $48.7M $1977
SERVICING SCENARIO
The missions compared remote servicing as opposed to a complete spacecraft replacement. No manned
servicing capability was assumed for the geosynchronous or the Sun synchronous orbits.
Previous studies undertaken by Space Systems/LORAL (formally Ford Aerospace) such as the Communication
Satellite System Operations with the Space Station (CSSO) study and the Geostationary Platform Bus Study
(GPBS) assumed that the full NASA infrastructure defined at that time (1986/1988) would be in place at the time
of the first launch. This infrastructure included a fully operational Space Station with Phase II assembly and
servicing capabilities, including IVA and EVA, fuel storage and transfer, an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle and the
use of a space based Orbital Transfer Vehicle. Delivery to the Space Station was by means of the STS, which,
in the case of the GPBS, included the External Tank Aft Cargo Carrier, or an expendable launch vehicle. The
remote servicer was the lOSS, a scaled down version of the Orbital Spacecraft Consumables Resupply System
(OSCRS), and the required ORU's.
The military METSAT did not utilize the Space Station and required an expendable servicing system.
SERVICING SCENARIO
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L__'_L__ m m
• Missions compared remote servicing versus spacecraft replacement
- No manned capability for GEO or SSO
• CSSO and GPBS missions
infrastructure
- Transportation systems
- Remote servicing systems
assumed full operational Space Station
• Military METSAT assumed no Space Station and required an expendable
servicing system
- No return capability from SSO
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SUMMARY OF TASK 1 RESULTS
The matrix on the opposite page is a summary of the results from the SATCAV model. These results included
inputs for the cost of the satellite, launch and repair kit costs. Tabulated are the LCC cost for both the serviced
and expendable case along with the resultant differences and percentage savings or increase.
SUMMARY OF TASK 1 RESULTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ LIml_.m.i.
Program
AST-5B
AST-5C
AST-7
AST-8
AST-9A
PHY-3B
NN/D-2B
NN/D-6
NN/D- 12
NN/D-14
GEO PLATFORM
COMSAT
METSAT-L
METSAT-G
Satellite
Cost ($M)
165.6
109.1
210.7
57.4
Satellite
Lnch Cost ($M)
Repair Kit
Cost ($M) _lon-Serviced
Life Cycle Cost ($M)
Serviced
168.2
100.2
76.2
83
91.2
87
85O
7O
40
100
68.9
63.8
118.9
219.4
36.5
30.5
41.3
36.2
2553.1
1420.5
3572.1
2355.6
83.9
236.1
130.5
96.1
136.2
57.8
212
65.4
60
107.7
36.8
41
43
42.9
34
26.1
733
44.6
45
47.1
3531.1
2134.5
3652.5
1675.3
4788.5
3178.6
7488
845
681
1273
1778.6
1t23.3
2277.7
2277.4
2177.3
1904.6
3227.4
1404.5
3250.9
1854
6564
675
717
1180
Savings ($M)
774.5
297.2
1294.4
78.2
1353.8
229.9
425.1
270.8
1537.6
1324.6
924
170
-36
93
Savings (%)
30
21
36
3
38
11
12
16
32
42
12
20
-5
7
33
COMPARISON OF SSES RESULTS
As can be seen from the comparative curves on the opposite page, the percentage savings between the the
original studies and those generated using the SATCAV model compare fairly closely.
•se!pnls JePlO
eq], to suo!lo!peJd eql 1o %S u!qiF_ eJe sllnseJ lepouJ AVOIVS eql 'lleJeAO •
•elep _l!l!qe!leJ lndu! eql oi eA!l!sues _lqS!q s! pele!l!u! suo!ss!m
5U!O!AJas #O JequJnu eq£ "uJeJSoJd eql _o el!l eql JeAO _l!l!qel!eAe uo!ss!m
eql eAe!qoe ol lleJoeoeds eql peoeldeJ pue suo!ss!m J!edeJ eJOin pe|e!l!u!
lepouJ AVO£VS eq£ "%_;L lnoqe _q peleJedes eJeM 8-J.SV pue 'L-ISV eql
"sllnseJ
_pnls sno!AeJd eql ql!M Sllnsej AVOIVS MeU eql seJedmoo IJeqo s!ql •
m
(_) S6UIAES I_UI6!JO
(_) S6U!AI_S 69
O
-o
N _ Z Z Z0 Z Z Z Z "0 > > >
I I I I I I , I I I I I 0
II
i
ol
o_
o£
017
o_
"o
t_
cB
o
r"
-k
cB
(..)
..<
O
o
¢I-
U_
<
_Q
S/'lnS=IEI S::lSS 40 NOSIEIVdlNO0
LCC SAVINGS Vs SATELLITE COST
Although there is a large amount of scatter in the points on this curve an attempt was made to bound
the points with a 'mean' line. The result was that a more realistic interpretation was a max/min curve.
Even so, these curves show that as the satellite costs increase the benefit of servicing increases.
LCC SAVINGS Vs SATELLITE COST
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LCC SAVINGS VS. LAUNCH COST
The curve on the facing page is a plot of the percentage LCC savings versus launch unit cost. As can be seen
there is a sizeable amount of scatter in the points but there appears to be a mean position where a line can be
plotted as is shown. It can seen that as the launch cost increase the benefit of servicing decreases.
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TASK 1 CONCLUSIONS
The average benefit in the LCC costs due to servicing is 19.6%. This indicates that there is potential benefit in
providing the servicing capability in certain satellite programs. However, the standard deviation of the results is
about 14.4% indicating a large spread in the data. This leads to the conclusion that the benefit of servicing is not
overwhelmingly conclusive and each program must be analyzed on a case by case basis.
Although the resultant data produced sizeable scatter, the trend indicates that the more costly the unit price of the
satellite the more benefit there is to building in a servicing capability. The results indicate that the maximum cost
benefit of servicing appears to be about 35%. Another benefit of servicing is in the number of satellites. As the
number of satellites increases, the benefit of servicing increases.
The cost of launching a servicing mission must also be considered. The results of the study show that as the
launch cost increase the benefit of servicing decreases. However, all in all, the results of this study effort track
reasonably well with previous studies. It is clear that for some missions servicing will provide savings in the LCC.
TASK 1 CONCLUSIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ Lm__m_ m m
• Average savings in life cycle cost due to servicing is 19.6%
- Indicates strong potential benefit due to servicing
• Standard deviation of above result is 14.4%
- Indicates large spread in data
- Servicing must be analyzed on a case by case basis
• Trend indicates that as the satellite unit cost increases, the
benefit of servicing increases
- Maximum benefit of servicing is approximately 35%
• As number of satellites increases, the benefit of servicing
increases
• Trend indicates that as the satellite launch cost increase, the
benefit of servicing decreases
• Results of the 1989 analysis track reasonably well with
previous results
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TASK 2 AND TASK 3 COMBINED
Task 2 and Task 3 are presented together for each of the 3 DRMs examined. This increases the
flow of the data from scenario development through analysis and results.
Task 2 Develop the servicing versus replacement scenario for each of the 3 design reference
missions (DRMs). The DRMs developed were for the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
(AXAF), the Polar Orbiting Platform (POPs), and the Explorer Platform. In general, four basic
missions were established. Expendable, Expendable Servicing, Shuttle Servicing and Space
Station Servicing. Shuttle and Space Station Servicing were not considered for the POP.
Task 3 normalizes the economic data of the selected scenarios and analyzes the data in a
parametric manner. The parametrics show the sensitivity effects on the LCC by varying either the
satellite cost, reliability, servicer system cost or launch cost.
TASK 2/TASK 3 COMBINED
SPACE SYSTEMS/ I=mw"___m__ m mmm=m
Task 2: ANALYZE NEW DRMs
• Develop servicing and expendable scenarios
• Format cost mass and reliability data
Task 3: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
• Use SATCAV model to generate program LCC
• Show sensitivity of reliability and cost
components on overall LCC
Design Reference Missions Included: AXAF, POP, EP
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AXAF
This DRM represents one of the 4 great observatories. The Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF)
mission is designed to collect astrophysical data over a wide range of the electromagnetic spectrum. The
spacecraft is configured for a Shuttle launch to a 325 nm orbit. The spacecraft has no on board propulsion and
over a 5 year period the orbit will degrade to 293 nm assuming nominal solar activity.
The AXAF spacecraft is designed for a 15 year mission with in-situ servicing every 5 years. During these
servicing periods, it is expected that the servicing vehicle will perform a velocity maneuver to re-boost the satellite
to a 325 nm orbit.
AXAF
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L__m_- == m
Mission:
Mission Duration:
Constellation:
Launch Vehicle:
Spacecraft Dry Mass:
Spacecraft Cost:
Astrophysics
15 Years
1 Satellite 28.5 ° X 325 nm orbit.
STS
30,000 Ibs
$525.0 M
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CANDIDATE SERVICING SCENARIOS
The 5 candidate scenarios shown on the facing page were identified for further investigation. These scenarios
were selected on the basis of their potential for reducing the cost of operating the AXAF spacecraft over the
mission life. More detailed descriptions of the scenarios and their evaluation is presented later in the report.
CANDIDATE SERVICING SCENARIOS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • -__"ffi_ i._ m
1. Servicing at the Space Station utilizing OMV for retrieval
2. Servicing in-situ utilizing a Space Station based SSS
3. Servicing in the Shuttle bay utilizing the OMV for retrieval
4, Servicing in-situ utilizing the ground based SSS
5, Servicing in-situ utilizing the ESS
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SPACE STATION BASED
SERVICING CONSIDERATIONS
If the OMV and SSS can be based at the Space Station a potential savings launch costs of up to $59M can be
realized. These savings are due the fact that each user will not be charged for transporting the OMV or SSS to
orbit. Space Station based servicing scenarios for low altitude spacecraft have one major disadvantage. The
orbital mechanics impose short windows of opportunity followed by long periods during which the spacecraft will
be inaccessible from the Space Station. These consideration are summarized on the facing page. The orbital
mechanics of Station based servicing will be discussed in subsequent charts.
SPACE STATION BASED SERVICING CONSIDERATIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_'m___ I m
• Station based servicing scenarios will reduce launch charges by as
much as $59 M,
- Savings will be dependent on methodology of OMV propellant
resupply
• Nodal alignment of AXAF and Space Station must be within 3°
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SPACE STATION BASED SERVICING,
OMV PERFORMANCE
Two of the candidate scenarios involved Space Station based servicing missions. The first of these
scenarios involved a remote servicing mission utilizing a Space Station based SSS. The second candidate
scenario was a retrieval scenario where the satellite would be retrieved from its orbit with a Station based
OMV, and transported to the Space Station for servicing. After servicing, the satellite would be returned to
orbit with the Station Based OMV. Since both of these missions involve the OMV, an analysis was
performed to determine the capability and limitations that the orbital mechanics would impose on the system
scenarios..
The difficulty in Station based servicing lies in the fundamental orbital mechanics of an inclined orbit. The
oblateness of the Earth produces a torque on the line of nodes which, at space station based orbits, act in
the opposite direction of the orbital motion. This phenomena, known as nodal regression, is a function of the
orbit inclination and radius. This implies that satellites at different altitudes and inclinations will have different
rates of nodal regression. The effect of differential rates of regression is shown in the chart on the facing
page.
For the AXAF mission, the differential nodal regression rate, difference between space station orbit and
AXAF orbit, is on the order of 0.27°/day (assuming AXAF degrades from 320nm to 293nm over 5 years).
Given the maximum propellant capacities of the OMV, this places extreme constraints on the servicing
window of opportunity. The servicing window will be discussed in subsequent charts.
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The chart below plots the waiting period between successive nodal alignments, as a function
of the difference in altitude between the space station orbit and the AXAF orbit. If the space
station is assumed to be located in a nominal 240 km orbit, then the differential altitude will
vary between approximately 53 nm to 80 nm. This will result in a waiting period between
successive nodal alignments in the order of 40 - 45 months. Due to this slow nodal drift,
approximately 8.4 ° per month, a 15-20 day window of opportunity will exist to rendezvous and
service the AXAF within a +3 ° nodal bandwidth. The larger the nodal bandwidth the larger
the window of opportunity, but the lower the transfer mass capacity. This window of
opportunity estimate assumes that both orbits are at the same inclination. Initial orbit
dispersions and second order orbit perturbations will result in inclination changes between
the space station and AXAF. The next few chart plot the OMV capabilities for orbit
altitude/inclination, and servicing scenarios. No attempt has been made to quantify the
potential second order effects, however, a follow-on mission analysis parametric study could
be performed, if requested.
ALIGNMENT WAITING TIME AS FUNCTION
OF DELTA ALT.
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_ K-- m
Wait6_ime (mos)
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OMV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
(NO PLANE CHANGE)
The chart on the facing page illustrates the performance capabilities of the OMV with the Propulsion Module. It
shows the OMV capability for four servicing options. It assumes however, that the maneuver is performed when
the space station and AXAF are coplanar (ie. same orbit inclination and nodal alignment). The delivery curve
assumes that the OMV delivers the payload to its final orbit, whereas, retrieval assumes that the OMV
rendezvous with the payload at its orbit location and delivers it back to the station. The retrieval and redeploy
would describe the scenario when the AXAF is brought back to the station for servicing, and redeployed to its
final orbit after servicing.
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OMV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
(MISSION PAYLOAD ROUND TRIP)
The chart on the facing page illustrates the performance capabilities of the OMV for a round trip mission with a
13,712 Ib payload and inclinations of up to 4 degrees. The chart shows that servicing is possible, provided that
the nodal alignment is within 3 degrees.
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OMV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
(MISSION PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL)
The chart on the facing page illustrates the performance capabilities of the OMV for a retrieval mission with a
13,712 Ib payload and inclinations of up to 4 degrees. The chart shows that retrieval is well within the capabilities
of the OMV, provided that the nodal alignment is within 3 degrees.
OMV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
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OMV SERVICE WINDOW
The chart on the facing page illustrates the potential servicing window for the AXAF servicing mission. Given a
maximum plane change capability of 3 degrees and delta altitude of approximately 70 nm, it is seen that the
service window is approximately 12 days. This means that the servicing mission must occur within a 12 day
period or it will be delayed by approximately 52 months. Given the workload on the Space Station crew, launch
vehicle manifesting difficulties and potential for OMV failures, this imposes a severe constraint on Station based
servicing.
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TYPICAL SERVICING COMPLEMENT
Trades performed during the Phase-B study indicated that the platform components could be divided into 3
categories:
1. Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs)
2. Contingency Replaceable Units (CRUs)
3. Replenishable Units (RUs)
Although the spacecraft design will allow on orbit servicing of any component with the exception of the cabling,
only the ORUs are scheduled for replacement. The servicing mission will consist of the components shown on
the opposite page. The total replacement cost of these components will be $289M, assuming that there is no
ground refurbishment.
TYPICAL SERVICING COMPLEMENT
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __m_, •
M
I
ORU Mass Units Req Total Mass
Science Instrument 1
Science Instrument 2
MPS Module
C&DH Module
Reaction Wheels
Inertial Ref. Units
SI Electronics
SI Gas Bottle
Solar Arrays
Total
965
710
625
445
120
38
50
50
7O5
1
1
2
1
3
2
2
2
2
3708 16
965
710
1250
445
360
76
100
100
1410
i
5416
• Total ORU Cost is $289M per servicing mission.
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ESTIMATED SPACE STATION COSTS
It is expected that the servicing payload consisting of the OMV fuel and AXAF ORUs will be
transported to the Space Station Freedom (SSF) approximately 2 weeks prior to the servicing
mission. During the mission staging period the ORUs will be monitored by the Station Crew
and it is expected that these operations will require continuous support by the SSF Data
Management (DMS) and Communications subsystems. The servicing mission will require
crew support on the order of 200 hrs of IVA and 10 hrs EVA. These estimates cover the
ORU checkout, servicing mission support and SSS integration. It is also estimated that SSS
integration will require up to 10 hrs of Remote Manipulator System (RMS) handling time. The
cost of these services is shown on the facing page. It should be noted that both of the
proposed SSF based servicing scenarios assume the existence of a SSF based OMV and/or
SSS. In addition, potential user charges for Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) have not been
included.
The costs shown in the chart on the facing page are for the in-situ servicing mission based
from the Space Station. The cost for a retrieval mission is expected to be more than double
that for the in-situ mission because of the dramatic increase in the amount of EVA and IVA
labor required to perform the ORU exchange operations. The estimated cost for servicing
the AXAF at the Station will be on the order of $65M which is in excess of the potential STS
launch savings of $59M. Based on the added complexity and lack of cost savings, servicing
of the AXAF spacecraft at the space Station was dropped from the list of candidate
scenarios.
ESTIMATED SPACE STATION COSTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_l_jg_._--. m
Service or Task
SSF Logistics Pallet Use
DMS Services
Communications Services
RMS services
EVA activity
IVA activity
Power
Total Cost
Unit Estimate
$3,600/Ib
$6,600/hr
Units
Reqd.
5,500
336
$2,500/hr
$41,700/h r
$123,000/h r
$19,000/hr
$220/kwhr
336
10
10
200
336
Cost ($M)
19.8
2.2
.8
.4
1.2
3.8
.1
28.3
• Assumes SSS is based at Space Station (not baseline for Station)
67
GROUND BASED SERVICING CONSIDERATIONS
The ground based servicing missions are not subjected to the severe launch window constraints as the SSF
based scenarios. Although ground based servicing systems require transportation to orbit each time they are
used, the addition flexibility in launch windows offsets the potential cost savings of Space Station based
scenarios. Further, the considerations of Expendable Servicing Systems explores the potential for utilizing less
expensive launch vehicles.
GROUND BASED SERVICING CONSIDERATIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ l--Imi_, t- i
• Servicing equipment must be transported to orbit each time they
are used
• Greater operational flexibility
- Less severe launch window constraints
- Servicing can be performed "on demand"
• Expendable scenario allows use of less expensive launch vehicles
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AXAF SSS SERVICING SCENARIO
The SSS servicing scenario pictured on the following page uses the STS to transport the SSS to a 280 nm orbit.
The OMV/SSS system would then rendezvous with AXAF and the SSS would perform the servicing operations
using its robotic capabilities. Upon completion of the servicing operations, the OMV would reboost AXAF to its
original orbit. After this maneuver has been completed, the OMV will return to the STS for capture and stowage
for return to the ground.
AXAF SSS SERVICING SCENARIO
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __ • I
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AXAF
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AXAF ESS SERVICING SCENARIO
The ESS servicing scenario pictured on the following page uses an ELV to transport the ESS to a 320nm
orbit. The ESS would then rendezvous with AXAF and would perform the servicing operations using its
robotic capabilities. Upon completion of the servicing operations, the ESS will perform a reboost maneuver
to return AXAF to its original orbit. After the reboost has been completed, the ESS will be placed in a
disposal orbit.
AXAF ESS SERVICING SCENARIO
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L__ I I
ESS
- Mr
I !
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AXAF
320 nm
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AXAF EVA SERVICING SCENARIO
The EVA servicing scenario pictured on the following page utilizes the STS to transport the OMV to orbit.
The OMV is then used to retrieve the spacecraft to the Shuttle bay. The servicing operations are performed
in the shuttle bay by EVA astronauts with support from the Astronaut Aid and RMS robotic systems.
Following the servicing operations, the OMV returns the spacecraft to its 320 nm orbit and returns to the
Shuttle. The placement and retrieval operations can be performed using the OMV fitted with the Propulsion
Module without additional refueling on orbit.
AXAF EVA SERVICING SCENARIO
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SERVICING SCENARIO SELECTION CRITERIA
Prior to performing the economic analysis, the five candidate scenarios were evaluated to determine their
relative performance. Each of the scenarios was ranked in terms of mission cost, risk and complexity.
Once each of the scenarios had been ranked, a down select was made based on their relative ranking in
terms of the these three factors.
Both of the space station based scenarios suffered from a high risk due to the short servicing window and
long period between servicing opportunities. The combinations of these two factors virtually eliminates the
possibility of performing an emergency servicing mission should a catastrophic spacecraft failure occur. In
addition, the additional complexity of handling the servicing equipment at the Space Station is an added
step that is unnecessary. Further, if the servicing system and ORUs were transported to the Space Station,
the potential reductions in launch costs would be eliminated and these scenarios would be even less
attractive. Finally, the high cost of the Space Station operations also increase the cost of these scenarios
because of the additional handling steps (removal from STS, checkout and integration w/OMV/SSS).
Overall these scenarios received the lowest ranking and thus were dropped from the candidate set.
The ground bases scenarios generally received higher marks in all three categories. The remote servicing
options were viewed to have the lowest complexity because of the reduced number of OMV operations. In
terms of risk, the ground based retrieval scenarios was seen to be the lowest because of the high level of
human involvement in the servicing operations. Past experience on the MMS program has demonstrated
the human ability to improvise and perform delicate operations that would be impossible for a robotic or
telerobotic system to perform. The retrieval scenario was found to have additional launch costs due to the
added mass of the Flight Support System and OMV fuel. In addition the cost of EVA will push the mission
cost even higher. Based on the cost and complexity considerations the retrieval scenario was dropped from
the candidate set. It should be noted that the expendable scenario received the highest marks. This is
largely due to the ability to use a lower cost launch vehicle.
SERVICING SCENARIO SELECTION CRITERIA
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L__ I I
Scenario
SSF Based In-Situ w/SSS
SSF Based Retrieval
Ground Based Retrieval
Ground Based SSS
Ground Based ESS
Cost
Med
Hi
Hi
Med
Lo
Risk
Hi
Hi
Lo
Med
Med
Complexity
Hi
Hi
Hi
Lo
Lo
Selected Set
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SERVICING MISSION MASS SUMMARY
The servicing mission mass breakdown is shown on the facing page. It should be noted that the servicer
mass shown includes the servicing vehicle, robotic servicer and any ASE. The propellant calculations
represent the necessary fuel to rendezvous with the AXAF during the servicing mission. The row titled
"other" represents a mass margin for the ESS and SSS case, and represents the Shuttle cradle weight to
stow the servicer and replacement ORUs during launch.
SERVICING MISSION MASS SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ I1_="_'="__ m m
Servicing Eqiupment
ORUs
SSS
Mass (Ibs)
ESS
Servicer (dry)
Fuel
Other
5416 5416
13994
3683
560
1257
300
250
EVA
5416
13994
7200
9220
Total 23653 7223 35830
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SATCAV COST INPUTS
The chart on the facing page illustrates the key recurring cost inputs to the SATCAV model. The costs
shown have the most significant contribution to the resultant life cycle cost. The spacecraft and ORU cost
inputs were derived from the AXAF Phase B estimates. Since AXAF is baselined for servicing, the
non-serviced spacecraft cost was estimated to be 10% less than the Phase B cost. This figure was arrived
at from the results of previous studies which indicates that serviceability increases the spacecraft cost by
10%. The spacecraft launch charges were based on a STS launch. It should be noted that the
non-serviceable spacecraft launch charges are lower because its estimated mass was 8% lower than the
corresponding serviceable spacecraft.
The ORU charges were derived from the Phase B study cost estimates for the projected servicing mission
payload compliment. The SSS servicer costs were based on the standard OMV and SSS user charges of
$6M per mission and $5M per mission, respectively, plus an additional $4M in crew training and
operational expenses. The SSS launch costs were based on a STS launch. The ESS servicer costs were
based on a recurring servicer cost of $30M plus $4M in crew training and operational costs. The ESS cost
was derived from an internal study which determined that a low cost mission specific servicer could be
manufactured for $30M, assuming that the design could draw on key technologies from previous programs
such as the FTS, SSS and the OMV. The ESS launch charges were based on a Delta II launch.
Other costs which were input to the model but are not shown in the chart include:
1. Payload operations cost of $31.5M per year which was used for all 3 cases.
2. A sustaining engineering cost of 2% of the spacecraft recurring cost.
3. A non-recurring spacecraft cost of 10% of the spacecraft recurring cost.
4. A servicer non-recurring cost of $24.3M and SSS.
It should be noted that the model requires all costs to be entered as a maximum, minimum and distribution
of the cost uncertainty. The cost shown are nominal costs. The model inputs were the nominal cost +/-
10% with a gaussian uncertainty distribution.
SATCAV COST INPUTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ a--_m_ •
Expenditure
iOriginal Satellite Costs
Satellite
Satellite Launch
Total
Servicing Costs
ORU
Servicer
Servicing Launch
Total
Expendable
525
169
694
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cost ($M)
SSS
583
180
763
289
15
129
433
ESS
583
180
763
289
30
52
371
EVA
583
180
763
289
7.5
193
490
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SATCAV MODELLING INPUT ASSUMPTIONS
Since SATCAV is Monte Carlo model, it requires input on the reliabilities of the spacecraft, the launch vehicles
and the servicer. In order to masking of the results by the reliability data, the probabilities of success (Ps) for the
servicer and launch vehicles were set to the standard values indicated earlier in the report. These probabilities
were agreed upon with NASA at the beginning of the study.
The AXAF Phase B study indicated that the projected servicing interval was 5 years and the spacecraft would
have a Ps of 0.44 at that time. With a Ps of 0.44, the SATCAV model predicted a much shorter servicing interval
and since it was felt that the 5 year interval was in good agreement with past experience the Ps inputs were
adjusted to 0.77 for the entire spacecraft. Since the spacecraft is designed to be almost completely serviceable
the Ps for the servicing mission was set to 0.88. This number is the combination of a probability of repairability of
the spacecraft of 0.9 and Ps of the servicer of 0.98.
SATCAV MODELLING INPUT ASSUMPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ LImi_dmL, K.-
• Cost data derived from AXAF Phase B Study, and escalated to FY89
dollars
The AXAF phase B study indicated that the projected servicing
interval was 5 years with a spacecraft Ps of 0.44
To maintain good agreement with past experience the SATCAV model
system reliability was adjusted to 0.77
The Ps for the servicing mission was set to 0.88. This number is the
combination of a probability of repairability of the spacecraft of 0.9
and Ps of the servicer of 0.98.
The Shuttle launch charges are based on a sliding scale based on
launch weight relative to launch capacity to orbit. The secondary
payload approach is not considered. (see Shuttle cost methodology in
the EP DRM section for description of costing procedure)
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AXAF RESULTS
The facing page shows the results of the AXAF economic analysis. Shown are some of the key model inputs as
well as the calculated number of satellites and number of repair kits required to perform the mission and the life
cycle cost. The life cycle cost shown is the 5% discounted cost. The numbers shown in the table are the average
values calculated by SATCAV. The standard deviations on each of the life cycle costs is approximately 10% for
all cases.
The output data indicate that 4.6 platforms are required for the expendable scenario, and that 1.4 platforms/3.0
servicing missions are required to maximize the overall availability over the 15 year mission lifetime. The
interpretation of the number of platform or servicing mission, as shown below, is the modelling implementation of
spreading the costs of a new platform or servicers. No modelling techniques are incorporated to stop the
implementation of a new platform or servicer near end-of-life if a failure occurs. So if a failure does occur near the
end of the mission lifetime, then a percentage of the replacement cost is spread over the remaining mission
years.
It was considered a fair assumption that the EVA case could always be serviced, and therefore, only 1 platform
would be required. However, for the expendable launched missions, the model used the probability of repair
data (Ps =0.9) to specify if a servicing failure could occur. Therefore, even though the system availability
remained approximately unchanged, the complement of replacement missions to service missions were not
identical.
AXAF RESULTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • -__ L._ i
Scenario
Non-Serviced
SSS Serviced
ESS Serviced
EVA Serviced
Satellite
i Cost ($M)
525
583
583
583
Sat. Launch
Cost ($M)
169
180
180
180
Repair Kit
Cost ($M)
N/A
308
323
338
Rep. Launch
Cost ($M)
N/A
129
52
193
Number of
Satellites
4.6
1.4
1.4
1.0
Number of
Repairs
N/A
3.0
3.0
3.4
Life Cycle
cost ($M)
2364
2039
1938
2116
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LIFE CYCLE COST COMPONENTS
The facing chart graphically illustrates the breakdown of the LCC for each of the cases. The chart clearly shows
that one of the principle reasons for the reduction in life cycle costs for the servicing cases over the non-servicing
cases is the reduction in launch costs. The reason this occurs is that the repair mission launch mass is less than
a replacement satellite cost. For the SSS case this translates into reduced shuttle launch charges. In the case of
the ESS it allows the use of a less expensive launch vehicle.
The left chart shows some of the similar information shown on the right chart except that the repair kit (ORU +
Servicer) costs have been added to the satellite cost. This graphically illustrates that the reduction in life cycle
cost is due to a reduction in the satellite replacement costs (hardware) and the launch cost over the program.
LIFE CYCLE COST COMPONENTS
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AXAF PARAMETRICS
Once a baseline set of results had been developed for all three cases, parametrics were run to determine the
sensitivity of the results to the following parameters: Satellite cost, reliability, Servicer Cost, and Launch Cost.
The satellite cost parametric was to determine the effect of the original asset cost on the economic viability of
servicing. In developing the parametric for this case, it was assumed that the satellite and replacement ORUs
were affected by the same amount. The 25% variation was selected in order to provide a sufficient variation in
the results to establish a pattern.
The reliability parametric was performed to investigate servicing strategies. The baseline spacecraft contained
sufficient redundancy to provide a 5 year servicing interval. The satellite reliability levels were adjusted to model
no redundancy and triple redundancy. In addition the spacecraft cost, mass and launch costs were adjusted
accordingly.
The servicer cost parametric was included to determine the impact of servicer system cost on the results. Initially
the cost of the SSS was decreased by $5M and increased by $25M. Correspondingly the ESS costs were
decreased by $5M and increased by $30M.
The launch cost parametric was included to determine the impact launch charges have on the economic
performance of servicing. The launch charges were varied by +/- 20% to establish a trend. It is important to note
that launch cost increases were assumed to be identical for both the Shuttle and the ELVs.
These 4 parametrics cover the major factors that determine the life cycle cost.
AXAF PARAMETRICS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L-_I... _--
Case
Non-Serviced
SSS Servicing
ESS Servicing
Parametric 1
Satellite Cost
S/C Rep Kit
NR R NR R
+25% +__25%N/A N/A
__+25% _+25% _+25% _+25%
_+25% _+25% _+25% _+25%
Parametric 2
Reliability*
Payld Bus
Parametric 3
Servicer Cost
Servicer
Ps Ps NR
0.85 0.66 N/A
0.88 0.99
0.85 0.66 N/A
0.88 0.99
0.85 0.66 -$5M
0.88 0.99 +25M
R
N/A
-$5M
+$25M
-$5M
+$30M
Parametric 4
Launch Cost
Rec. Cost
_+20%
_+20%
Svcr
N/A
N/A
N/A
* Satellite, repair kit and launch costs adjusted accordingly
5% DISCOUNTED LCC PARAMETRIC RESULTS
Parametric I
Case
Non-Serviced
SSS Serviced
ESS Serviced
Hi Nominal Lo
2740 2364 1988
2342 2039 1736
2249 1938 1628
Parametric 2 Parametric 3
Hi Nominal Lo Hi Nominal Lo
2371 2364 2500 N/A 2364 N/A
1944 2039 2092 2079 2039 2031
1937 1938 1938 2010 1938 1925
Parametric 4
Hi Nominal Lo
2459 2364 2268
2126 2039 1952
1998 1938 1877
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PARAMETRIC 1 RESULTS
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of satellite cost on the relative economic performance of the
two servicing scenarios. The graph is plot of the spacecraft recurring cost versus the difference in the
non-serviced and serviced LCC (ie. the life cycle cost savings due to servicing).
The plot shows that servicing is marginally cost effective for the Shuttle launched SSS mission for the nominal
satellite cost (the mid point on the curve). For the nominal satellite cost the percentage of the life cycle cost
savings is on the order of 14%, however, the standard deviation on the life cycle cost typically runs around 10%.
This implies that given the uncertainty in the results, servicing may or may not be cost effective. The performance
of the SSS scenario was independent of variation in satellite cost.
The results for the ESS indicate that servicing is definitely more cost effective. The reason for the improvement
in performance is the use of a less expensive launch vehicle for the servicing missions. The percentage in LCC
reduction is approximately 18% over the entire range of variation.
The results indicate that the relative benefit of servicing is independent of satellite cost. The reason for this is that
when the satellite cost goes up, the cost of replacement components rises as well which causes the percentage
of life cycle cost savings to be relatively constant with changing satellite cost.
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PARAMETRIC 2 RESULTS
Parametric 2 involved varying the spacecraft reliability from no redundancy to triple redundancy. In most cases,
the spacecraft bus included 2:1 redundancy, but the payload was mostly single string. Therefore, the reliability
variation for the bus ranged from single-to-triple redundancy schemes, but the payload reliability was not
significantly effected with a redundancy variation. This resulted in a Ps variation of 0.66 and 0.99 for the bus, and
a 0.88 and 0.85 variation for the payload. As discussed earlier, the spacecraft mass, ORU mass, spacecraft cost,
ORU cost and launch costs were adjusted accordingly. The curves illustrate the expected effect of reliability on
the performance of servicing. That is, as redundancy decreases, the satellite cost and associated launch costs
decreases. Also as redundancy and hence the reliability of the satellite decreases, the number of replacement
satellites and/or servicing missions decreases. Since the servicing mission costs are less than the satellite
replacement mission costs, servicing will be more cost effective for this case (the breakdown of servicing mission
costs is shown in a later graph). The converse of this argument applies to the increased redundancy case by the
same reasoning. Additional redundancy implies additional satellite and launch costs but fewer replacement
missions. Since the servicing missions cost much less than the replacement missions servicing again more cost
effective. The reason servicing appears to be less cost effective for this variation is that the number of servicing
and/or replacement mission is decreased, and as the number of servicing mission drops the LCC tends toward
the non-servicing life cycle cost.
An interesting result is that the most cost effective redundancy strategy is the baseline strategy (see parametric
results table). This suggests that a unique combination of redundancy and servicing will provide the lowest
overall life cycle cost.
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PARAMETRIC 2 RESULTS
The preceding graph showed that both servicing scenarios offered the same performance in terms of LCC. The
reason for this was that the increased redundancy caused a change in launch vehicles for the ESS case. The
added mass due to the increased redundancy forced a change from the Delta II to an Atlas/Centaur. This
dramatically increased the launch costs and diminished the benefit of the expendable servicer. This concept is
illustrated graphically in the chart on the facing page. In this case the SSS actually would be the preferred choice,
since it would probably have increased capability and reliability over a mission specific servicer.
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PARAMETRIC 3 RESULTS
The graph on the facing page shows the impact of servicer cost on the economic performance of servicing for
both the ESS and SSS servicing missions. In the case of the SSS mission, the servicer users fee was reduced by
$5M and increased by $25M. For the ESS mission, the servicer cost was reduced by $5M and increased by
$30M. Since the goal of this parametric was to establish what the users could afford to pay for servicing systems,
it was decided to run additional cases where the servicer cost was tripled and quadrupled for both servicing
systems.
The attached plot clearly shows that servicer system cost can be increased significantly before the benefit of
servicing becomes questionable. The approximate standard deviation of the results has be drawn on the graph to
illustrate the maximum costs of the servicing systems. Reading from the graph it can be seen that the maximum
users fee for the SSS is about $60M and the maximum servicer cost is approximately $125M.
PARAMETRIC 3 RESULTS
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IMPACT OF SERVICING ON MISSION COST
The primary difference in costs between the ESS and SSS servicing mission is the launch vehicle. Since the
launch vehicle is major contributor to servicing mission cost, a second plot of the parametric 3 data is shown to
illustrate the effect of servicing mission cost on the economic performance of servicing. The x axis of the plot is
"Repair Mission Cost" which is composed of the ORU costs, the servicer cost and the servicing mission launch
costs. The chart shows that the break even point for servicing is with a servicing mission cost of $475M. This
means that the sum of the three mission cost components must be less then or equal to $475M for servicing to be
economically viable.
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PARAMETRIC 4 RESULTS
Parametric cases were run with +/- 20% variation in launch costs and the results are summarized in the graph on
the facing page. The chart shows the general trend that as launch cost increase, servicing becomes more cost
effective. This is again due to the fact that servicing requires that only a fraction of the total satellite mass be
transported to orbit. The reason for the difference in slopes for the SSS and ESS cases is that the ESS allows
the use of a lower cost launch vehicle.
PARAMETRIC 4 RESULTS
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AXAF SUMMARY
The study examined many servicing options and compared the total LCC to a similar expendable
spacecraft which are replaced rather than serviced. The study narrowed the option field down to
ESS, SSS, and EVA based servicing options. It was determined that servicing through the space
station resulted in higher cost, and the risk to the mission success was unduly jeopardized by the
short window of opportunity, and the long waiting periods between successive servicing windows.
The three servicing options all proved to be cost effective over an expendable AXAF. The ESS
costs were derived from an in-house preliminary study, as no funded ESS study currently exists. It
is felt that the technology for a mission specific-simple ORU replacement robotic system will be
available during the mission time frame. However, the costs were based upon the timely
development of the SSS and OMV programs. Although the OMV funding has been eliminated, it is
our opinion that a similar program with a limited scope should be initiated to fill the gap. We make
this recommendation based on the potential LCC saving resulting from this study, and many other
reputable studies.
AXAF SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __ • m
The data indicates that an Expendable Servicer results in a potential
LCC savings of 18% ($426M) over an expendable AXAF
The SSS option results in a potential LCC savings of 13.7% ($325M)
over an expendable AXAF
The EVA option results in a potential LCC savings of 10.5% ($248M)
over an expendable AXAF
Reliability has a major effect on the benefit of servicing; it effects
both frequency and cost of servicing mission. The LCC cost results
from a unique combination of redundancy and servicing.
Th:nParametric study has shown that if servicer costs are higherthe stated baseline, servicing could still remain cost effective.
The exact value is dependant on the servicing scenario.
The data supports the conclusion that SSF-based servicing is not
cost effective,
The servicing window of opportunity from SSF is less than 3
weeks, wnth approx a 4 year waiting period before nodal alignment.
This severe constraint will result in longer lead time planning to
ensure the window of opportunity is not missed, thus increasing
servicing related costs.
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INTRODUCTION: CURRENT POP ARCHITECTURE
The current US Polar Orbiting Platform (POP) Program consists of three EOS-A platforms and three EOS-B
platforms. These platforms have a 5 year mission life to provide continuous Earth observations for 15 years.
EOS-A series of platforms will support a payload of 3,000-3,500 kg, and provide 6 kW total power output. The
design life of each platform is limited by the expected lifetime of the Earth observation sensors. EOS-A platforms
are scheduled for replacement at 5 year intervals, but are being designed for servicing if an effective means
becomes available during the life of the mission. EOS-B platforms are envisioned to be similar in design to the
EOS-A platforms, but with a modified payload complement. It is the objective of the Satellite Servicing Economic
Study to model, as close as possible, the current POP architecture, and to investigate servicing options that would
directly compare with a replacement platform strategy.
INTRODUCTION: CURRENT POP ARCHITECTURE
SPACE SYSTEMS/ _-Imi_g_, l--- -----
POP current system architecture
Eos-A:
• Current baseline of 3 platforms each with a 5 year design life,
located in a 705 km, sun-synchronous 1:30 pm nodal crossing time.
° Payload mass of 3,000 kg
° 6 kW average platform power, 3.2 kW for the payload
° The baseline architecture calls for replacement of the platform after
5 years. However, the platform ORUs are designed to be serviced, if
an effective means of on-orbit servicing becomes available
Eos-B
° 3 platforms similar to Eos-A with expanded science capabilities to
monitor global change
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APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
The approach is to investigate the expendable and serviceable alternatives for EOS-A Platforms. No attempt has
been made to evaluate EOS-B platforms due to the limited data available. It was also assumed that the cost
trends generated for EOS-A platforms would be representative for EOS-B as well.
One expendable scenario and two serviceable scenarios are presented in this study. Many architecture studies
have been performed (see references) in the past to evaluate the benefits of various servicing options. The two
most recommended servicing options were chosen for the baseline servicing options in this study: The Add-On
Active Carrier; and the Active Carrier with robotic exchange capabilities. It was assumed that each of these
servicing options have the capability to rendezvous and dock with the POP. In other words, the POP will not be
required to de-orbit for servicing.
The Atlas II launch vehicle was selected over the Delta II launch vehicle to carry the servicer to orbit. The
decision was based on the recommendations of the Hixson Report, May 1990. This study did not undertake a
packaging analysis and trade study to justify this selection. The Hixson Report found that the Atlas II could
provide a much higher percentage of serviceable payload than the Delta I1.
The payload servicing strategy assumed the "replace at design life" method. All science instruments were
assumed to have a 5 year design life with a probability of success of 0=85. If however, the model triggers either a
launch or on-orbit spacecraft failure, a replacement platform or servicing mission is initiated.
APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_ K-- --_"
• The POP-SSES will investigate serviceable and expendable cases
Eos-A platform series. No attempt has been made to cost the
platform system.
of the
Eos-B
• Each scenario has been defined using available data, and by assumptions
when data was not available.
MISSION
events
Earth observation of global change
ORBIT
LAUNCH VEHICLE
MISSION LIFETIME
PLATFORM R COST
SERVICING OPTIONS
705 km, sun synchronous, 1:30 pm
nodal crossing time.
Titan IV Initial Placement
Atlas II Servicing
Total: 20 years
On-orbit:
$700M
1.
2.
15 years
Active Add-on Carrier
Active Carrier with Robotic
Exchange System
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ADD-ON CARRIER PLATFORM SCENARIO
The diagram below illustrates the major event sequence of initial placement and servicing of the POP using an
Add-on carrier methodology. The initial placement is identical for all POP scenarios examined in this study. The
expendable platform scenario, which is used to evaluate the cost effectiveness of a servicing option, utilizes the
initial placement scenario each time a satellite failure occurs. As can be seen, this will provide a direct
comparison between the cost of a servicing mission relative to the cost of replacement.
The Add-On Carrier Serviceable option consists of one platform bus designed for a 15 year mission life. The
expected wear out of the sensors is 5 years, therefore, nominal servicing missions are scheduled for year 5 and
year 10. The Titan IV launch vehicle is assumed for initial launch and placement of the platform, and the Atlas II
series launch vehicle is assumed for the launch of the active carrier servicing vehicles. The Atlas was the
recommended servicer launch vehicle, as mentioned previously, to maximize the percentage of science payload
serviced.
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ACTIVE CARRIER ROBOTIC EXCHANGE SCENARIO
The robotic exchange servicing option uses a similar active carrier vehicle as the Add-On carrier. The design is
not subject to the same thermal compatibility requirements as the Add-on carrier, and more ports are available for
instrument mounting because the instruments are not required to be in their on-orbit configuration during carrier
transfer. The robotic exchange system is a reuseable system that integrated onto the active carrier and
transported to the platform on the first servicing mission. The robotic exchange system remains permanently on
the platform for future servicing missions.
ACTIVE CARRIER ROBOTIC EXCHANGE SCENARIO
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INITIAL PLACEMENT 113 SERVICING MISSION
GENERAL POP ASSUMPTIONS
Servicing of the platform is limited to expendable launch vehicles, as no capability exists for Shuttle launches to
near-polar orbits.
The Titan IV launch vehicle is assumed for initial launch and placement of the platform, and the Atlas II series
launch vehicle is assumed for the launch of the servicing missions. The Atlas was the recommended servicing
launch vehicle, as mentioned previously, to maximize the percentage of science payload serviced.
The ideal method of treating failures would have been to ascertain accurate POP reliability and planning data, and
to translate this data into a strategy consistent with model inputs, hat would trigger a servicing mission when a
specific threshold was reached. This threshold could either be defined as a specific sensor failure, a combination
of sensor failures, or a bus failure. Two problems prevented this approach from being implemented; An existing
strategy with consistent probable failure data, and a SATCAV model limitation. Although some probability of
failure data was available in the D. Hixson report (POP Servicing Study, Final Report, May 7, 1990), no strategy
for specifying what series or combinations of failures should trigger a servicing mission.
The model was originally designed for identical servicing missions, and therefore, is not capable (without model
modifications not funded in this study) of triggering servicing missions specific to different sensor failures. Since
the maximum expected lifetime of the sensors was 5 years, the servicing mission was designed for that specific
servicing scenario. An overall system reliability number of .75 P(s) at 7°5 years, specified by Chris Scolese, Eos
Project Office at GSFC, was used.
GENERAL POP ASSUMPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L__. _--- i
• No STS servicing capability to polar orbit
• Atlas II launch vehicle assumed for servicing missions
• 5 year engineering development period
• System level reliability of .75 @ 7.5 years was assumed
-- science payload: 0.85
-- Platform bus: 0.88
• The repair mission assumed a 5 year expected lifetime for all science
instruments. If a failure occurred prior to the 5 year intervals, the
model would initiate a repair mission.
• The SATCAV model is designed for only one definition of the repair
mission. The SATCAV model servicing criteria will initiate a repair
mission when a specific combination of system failures occur.
However, we were not able to ascertain a servicing strategy which
prioritized sensors to determine what combination of failures can be
allowed before a servicing mission is initiated. Therefore, system
level reliability was assumed,
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POP BASELINE INPUT COSTS TO SATCAV MODEL
The baseline costs for the POP scenarios are shown below. Most of the cost data has been extracted from the
Hixson report (May,1990), and some modifications were made with input from Chris Scolese, GSFC.
When a failure occurs, either total platform replacement or a repair mission is initiated. Total replacement is
always assumed in the expendable scenario, and only assumed for the serviceable scenarios if the platform can
not be serviced. A 90% repairability factor is assumed to account for the probability that the platform can not be
serviced. The repair mission consists of a servicer and launch vehicle. S=nce the model is restricted to identical
repair mission costs, and a total of 3 servicers are required to replace the entire payload complement, a complete
servicing mission must include three launches and three servicers to replace the entire payload. To account for
the reliability effects of 3 servicing launches per servicing mission, the launch vehicle reliability was adjusted from
.98, as agreed in the mid-term report, to 0.94.
Instrument and platform spares are not input into the model. The method by which the model accounts for the
cost of spares is when a failure triggers a replacement or repair mission to meet the mission lifetime.
The baseline costs for the Add-On carrier serviceable option were increased over the expendablecase to allow
for the. added development and hardware modification costs. GE Astro Space has concluded that 2 Add-On
carriers could be accommodated by the existing platforms without significant design modifications.
Previous packaging studies discussed in the Hixson Report have concluded that 3 Add-On carriers would be
necessary to replace the entire POP instrument payload. As a result of the additional design analysis and
hardware modifications necessary to support at least 3 Add-On carriers, the NR cost of the platform for the
Add-On scenario was increased by 50% and the recurring cost by 10% over the expendable platform.
The baseline costs for the Active Carrier, Robotic Exchange serviceable option were increased over the
expendable case to .allow for the.added development and hard-ware modification costs to incorporate the robotic
system. Although the current platform design is being designed for servicing, it was not known whether that
includes the necessary scarring to accommodate the Robotic Exchange System (RES). Therefore, the NR cost
of the platform was increased by 20%, and the recurring cost by 10%. Platform integration costs for both of the
serviceable options were assumed to be 20% higher than the expendable platform.
Since the recurring cost of the Robotic Exchange System and the cost of Robot-to-platform integration is a one
time cost, the model treated this as a nonrecumng cost input.
The WTR pad modification was apoint of some controversy. The $500M was verified by ,D=Hixson and includedin the POP Servicing Study Final Report. Itwas however, a questionable line ![em accoraing L;. bcolese, _b _.
The question still remains unanswered whether the POP program would bear the total cost of such a modification
in the year 2000 time frame. An in-h.ouse decision was made to implement the full $500M in the baseline
scenario, but show in the parametrics, the scenario without the charge.
POP BASELINE INPUT COSTS TO SATCAV MODEL
Initial Placement
Platform
Instrument set
Platform Integration
Payload Integration
Total Replacement
Hardware Cost
Servicer
Active Carrier Servicer
Serviceable Inst, set
ORU's
PL Integration
Platform Systems
Robotic Each Syst
Robot Integration
WTR Pad Modifications
Total Servicer
Hardware Cost
Expendable
NR R
($M) ($M)
241
579
237
300
62
100
699
0.0
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Add-On
NR R
($M) ($M)
361.5
579
260
300
74.4
100
734.4
50 31
100
50
20
23
500
224.0
m
Robotic Exch
NR R
($M) ($M)
289.2
579
260
300
74.4
100
734.4
50
100
500
31
100
50
20
23
30
12.8
266.8
POP RESULTS COST SUMMARY
The results of each the POP scenarios are summarized below. The results indicate that servicing does not
appear cost effective given the assumptions and baseline input costs. The total discounted LCC of the
Expendable scenario is $3652M in FY89 dollars. The nearest serviceable option is $4342M, an increase of
$690M. The differences in the total discounted LCC between the two serviceable scenarios (Add-on carrier and
Robotic Exchange carrier) are small, approximately 1.6%.
The output data indicate that 4.6 platforms are required for the expendable scenario, and that 1.5 platforms/3.1
servicing missions are required to maximize the overall availability over the 15 year mission lifetime. The
interpretation of the number of platform or servicing mission, as shown below, is the modelling implementation of
spreading the costs of a new platform or servicers. No modelling techniques are incorporated to stop the
implementation of a new platform or servicer near end-of-life if a failure occurs. If a failure does occur near the
end of the mission lifetime, then a percentage of the replacement cost is spread over the remaining mission
years.
The LCC costs spans a 20 year program time frame; 5 years of development, and 15 years of active on-orbit
performance. If a failure occurred during launch, a new platform was launched. If a payload or platform failure
occurred, a servicing mission would be attempted in order to maintain system availability for the full 15 year
mission life. The serviceable platform assumed a 90% factor for a successful servicing mission. No degradation
of that factor was assumed after a successful servicing mission. If the platform could not be serviced, then a new
platform would be launched.
The serviceable scenarios have included a one time nonrecurring cost of $500M to modify the WTR for Atlas
launch capability. The possible exclusion of this line item has been examined in the parametric analysis. When
this NR WTR cost is removed the total discounted LCC difference between all three cases is approximately
$260M, or 6.8%.
POP RESULTS COST SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_ I--- m
POP 1
(Exp)
POP 2
(Add-On Carrier)
POP 3
(Active Carrier
Robotic
Exchange)
INPUT DATA OUTPUT DATA
Satellite Sat Launch Servicing Servicing Mission
Cost Cost Mission Cost Launch Costs LCC # # Servicing
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) SAT Mission
699 250 N/A N/A 3652 4.3 0
735 250 224 75 4342 1.5 3.2
735 250 267 75 4412 1.5 3.1
3 servicing missions are necessary to replace the entire instrument set
Expendable platform is the most cost effective solution
Add-On Carrier and Robotic Exchange Carrier are within 2% of each
other. Too close for a meaningful conclusion.
If the WTR NR cost is removed from the POP 2 and POP 3, then all
three scenarios are within 8%, which is below the 10% confidence
threshold defined at the beginning of the study.
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LIFE CYCLE COST COMPONENTS
The bar graphs below depict the undiscounted components of the the total LCC for each of the POP scenarios.
Two graphical representations are shown so that a comparison can be made between the platform and repair
mission costs individually, and combined. As would be expected, the platform cost for the expendable scenario is
much higher than the servicing scenarios. However, when the total cost of the combined platform and repair
mission costs are examined, it shows that an efficient servicing strategy has not been realized.
There are three main contributors which undermine the cost effectiveness of the POP servicing scenarios. The
first, is that the cost to repair the platform is just as expensive as to replace it. The second, is that three Atlas
launch vehicles, which are required to replace the payload complement, is on the same order as a single Titan IV
platform launch. Thirdly, the $500M NR cost to upgrade the WTR for Atlas launches.
All of these major factors have a common source. The requirement to replace the entire payload set at the
expected lifetime of 5 years. If this is truly an uncompromising requirement, and the reliability estimate is
representative, then the stated conclusion that platform replacement is the most cost effective solution is
reasonable. However, one might argue that servicing mission costs could be decreased significantly if the
servicing strategy could be altered. For example, if the availability requirement could be backed off so that
servicing missions could be scheduled based on impending failure analysis, and be prioritized by instrument,
then the 3.2 servicing missions called out in the model could be reduced.
To examine this further, two potential analysis techniques could be initiated. The first, would involve a more
detailed instrument reliability analysis, probably in a parametric fashion unless the stated failure modes and failure
probabilities are well understood. This would be combined with a couple of prioritized servicing strategies that
would map out a solution path for the SATCAV model to follow in order to identify when a servicing mission
should be initiated. The result would be a more quantitative relationship between actual servicing mission costs
and system availability.
The second technique to examine the impact of servicing costs on the LCC benefits is to assume that only two
launches are required to service the platform at the expected lifetime. Although this is a very simplistic
methodology, and cannot be directly related to the effect on system availability, it still provides a reasonable basis
for the potential benefits of more detailed analysis. It is not within the scope of the current study to perform the
detailed analysis. Therefore, the simplistic approach will be examined in the context of the parametric analysis to
follow.
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POP PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS INPUTS
The following chart shows the 4 parametric studies for the Expendable, and Active Carrier Robotic Exchange
mission scenarios. The Add-On carrier was not included in the parametrics because the baseline results were a
were very close to the Robotic Exchange mission, and that It was felt that the one case would adequately indicate
the cost savings trends of servicing versus replacement platforms.
The $500M WTR pad modification costs of have not been included in the following parametrics. It was mentioned
earlier in the text, that it was not clear from the available information whether this represented actual cost to
modify the WTR for Atlas launches, or, if the POP program would be charged the entire cost of such a
modification. The decision was made to include the cost in the baseline analysis, but to eliminate it from the
parametric analysis.
POP PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS INPUTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ l--Imi_, m--- ----
PARAMETRIC
CASES
POP A (Expendable)
POP C (Robotic Exch)
PARAMETRIC 1
SATELLITE COST
PAYLOAD
HR R
±25% ±25%
±25% ±25%
REPAIR KIT
HR R
±25% ±25%
PARAMETRIC 2
RELIABILITY
SENSOR BUS
MTTF MTTF
SERV KIT
NR R
80.8/10.4
PL cost Rec +35%
PL cost NR _+10%
PL cost Rec +35%
PL cost NR _+10%
Repair Kit Rec +30%
I
PARAMETRIC 3
SERVICER SYS. COST
bervlcer
La_Inch
HR
Serv. Min
-25% 386
Rob.ExMax
-25% 467
NRCost
R HR
Min
136
Max
165
PARAMETRIC 4
LAUNCH COST
RECURRING
Initial Servicer
±20%
_+20% _+20%
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POP SERVICING MISSION COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of repair cost on the relative economic benefits of servicing.
The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding expendable
spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement spacecraft
scenario is the most cost effective.
The plot shows that if servicing the entire payload is required, then the platform replacement is more cost
effective. The baseline servicing kit cost for 3 servicing missions is $626M, and the replacement cost for the
Expendable and Robotic Exchange option is $699M and $735M, respectively. In addition, the launch costs for a
servicing mission (3 Atlas launch vehicles) is estimated at $225M, versus the replacement platform launch costs
of $250M (Titan IV). Clearly, these numbers do not give the servicing option much chance of being cost effective.
To obtain some useful comparisons with the following parametrics, a modified servicing mission has been
defined. The rationale was to reduce the number of servicers required per servicing mission. This was
accomplished by assuming only 2 Atlas launched servicers would be required per servicing mission. This will
reduce the total payload replaced, but it will also show the the potential benefits that servicing can produce. The
following modifications were assumed.
• $240M payload replaced
• $100M ORUs
• $40M Payload integration
• $60M Active Carriers
° $30M Robotic Exchange System
• $20M Platform Systems
• $10M Robotic Integration
The following parametric charts will show the potential servicing benefits of both the baseline and modified repair
kits.
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POP SPACECRAFT COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of satellite cost on the relative economic benefits of servicing.
The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding expendable
spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement spacecraft
scenario is the most cost effective.
This parametric was generated by varying the NR and R cost for both the platform and servicing mission. The
plot shows that servicing is not cost effective for the baseline servicing mission when full payload replacement is
required, even with a 20% reduction in spacecraft and servicing mission costs. Servicing becomes cost effective
for the modified repair mission. The trend for the modified repair mission increases slightly with increasing
satellite cost. The trend for the baseline data decreases with increasing spacecraft costs due to the high relative
cost of the servicer mission.
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POP LAUNCH COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of launch cost variation on the relative economic benefits of
servicing. The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding
expendable spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement
spacecraft scenario is the most cost effective.
The launch costs were varied by +20% relative to the baseline launch costs. The plots show a relatively flat
response in LCC savings for a serviceable option. The modified servicing mission curve increases with
increasing launch costs. This means that as launch costs increase, the platform replacement costs increase
more than servicing costs and therefore, an increase in LCC savings due to servicing results. The opposite trend
for the baseline data indicates that servicing mission and associated launch costs are greater than replacement
costs, and therefore, the LCC savings due to servicing decreases as launch costs increase.
POP LAUNCH COST PARAMETRIC
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• This chart shows the sensitivity of LCC savings of the servicing over
expendable mission, as a function of the launch cost.
• The Modified Repair mission data trend indicates that as launch costs
increase by a fixed percentage for both servicing and replacement, the
benefit of servicing increases. This is simply due to the fact that platform
launch costs are greater than servicing launch costs.
• The Baseline servicing trend indicates that as launch cost increases, the
benefit of servicing decreases. This is true because the servicing mission
launch costs are slightly higher than the expendable launch costs.
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POP SUMMARY
The results indicate that servicing is notcost effective given the assumptions and baseline input
costs. The total discounted LCC of the Expendable scenario is $3652M in FY89 dollars. The
nearest serviceable option is $4342M, an increase of $690M. The differences in the total
discounted LCC between the two serviceable scenarios (Add-on carrier and Robotic Exchange
carrier) are small, approximately 1.6%.
There are three main contributors which undermine the cost effectiveness of POP servicing
scenarios. The first, is that the cost to repair the platform is just as expensive as to replace it.
The second, is that the costs of three Atlas launch vehicles, which are required to completely
replace the payload complement, is on the same order as the cost of a single Titan IV platform
launch, and thirdly, the $500M NR cost to upgrade the WTR for Atlas launches.
The parametrics shows that servicing becomes cost effective when the servicing ground rules are
changed. First, the $500M WTR pad modification costs were not included in the parametrics.
Then, a change in the servicing mission reduced the number of servicers required per servicing
mission. This was accomplished by assuming only 2 Atlas launch vehicles and servicers would
be required per servicing mission° This will reduce the total payload replaced, but it will also
show the the potential benefits that servicing can produce. Although this is a very simplistic
methodology, and cannot be directly related to the effect on system availability, it still provides a
reasonable basis to understand when servicing POP becomes cost effective.
POP SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_ m--- mm_m
The .Baseline results found that if total payload replacement is a
requirement, then platform replacement is more cost effective than
servicing.
In order to replace the entire payload set, three servicers and launch
vehicles are required. This drove the servicing mission costs to the same
order as the platform replacement costs.
The Add-on carrier and Robotic Exchange servicing scenarios were very
close in total LCC. However, the number of Add-on carriers required for
complete payload replacement cannot be accommodated by the existing
platform design.
The parametric study showed that:
• The trend of launch, servicing mission, and platform replacement costs
were highly dependant on the ratio of the servicing to platform replacement
cost.
• Servicing the POP could be cost effective if servicing mission costs were
reduced.
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EXPLORER PLATFORM CURRENT SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The current Explorer Program consists of the Multi-mission Modular Spacecraft and a platform equipment deck
(PED) to support various science payloads. The MMS supplies the entire Explorer Platform (EP) with power,
attitude control, communications and data handling. Mission specific support equipment can be mounted into
available PED modules.
The First EP mission will support the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) which will be launched by a Delta II
launch vehicle. After completion of its mission (approximately 3.5 years), a second payload such as the X-Ray
Timing Experiment (XTE) will be launched by the STS. The Explorer satellite will be retrieved, and the EUVE
payload will be exchanged on-orbit with the new science payload.
It is the objective of the SSES to model the current EP architecture and to compare the servicing strategy with an
expendable platform and other servicing options.
EXPLORER PLATFORM CURRENT
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
SPACE SYSTEMS/ _lmi_. I-- i
The MMS forms the core spacecraft for the Explorer Platform
with a design life of 10 years
The payload equipment deck is a modular equipment rack to
accommodate mission specific support systems not provided
by the 3 MMS subsystem modules (MEPS, MACS, and C&DH)
Initial launch of the EP is on a Delta II with the EUVE payload
The mission life of the EUVE is approx 3.5 years with no
required servicing
A Shuttle based servicing mission will be performed to remove
the EUVE payload and install a second experiment (possibly
XTE)
A third experiment to utilize the full 10 year MMS design life
has not been identified
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APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
The approach is to investigate and compare the economic benefits of expendable and serviceable alternatives for
the EP. One expendable and four serviceable scenarios are presented. Each option assumes initial launch of the
EP in a Delta II launch vehicle with the EUVE payload. Then, whether or not the scenario is expendable or
serviceable a replacement payload like the XTE is assumed. The STS serviceable options include, Shuttle
retrieval of the EP at 330 nmi, Shuttle launch to 160 nmi and OMV retrieval, and Shuttle to SSF where the new
payload is integrated to the OMV. The last servicing option utilizes the Expendable Servicing System (ESS)
launched on an expendable launch vehicle.
APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ ==-=_=_ • m
• The approach is to investigate STS and expendable servicing options
for the EP and compare with individual and expendable platforms.
MISSION
ORBIT
LAUNCH VEHICLE
MISSION LIFETIME
PLATFORM R COST
SERVICING OPTIONS
Science, Astrophysics
330 nmi, 28.5 ° inclined, nominal
Delta II Initial Placement
STS, Delta II Servicing
Total: 11 years
On-orbit: 7 years
$103M
1. Shuttle-based
2. Shuttle/OMV
3. Space Station Freedom/OMV
4. Expendable Servicing system
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EXPENDABLE PLATFORM SCENARIO
The expendable platform scenario assumes that each of the two science payloads are integrated and launched
on expendable satellites. The assumption was made to use the existing MMS spacecraft as the expendable
satellite since development of the MMS with EUVE is an existing mature design. It is conceivable that a new
spacecraft design tailored to the weight, power, reliability, and lifetime of each science payload could be lower in
cost. However, this would have taken a significant amount of effort to achieve the same confidence in the cost
numbers. Also, the current approach will present a real comparison to the existing servicing architecture.
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SHUTTLE BASED SERVICING SCENARIO
This servicing scenario assumes the EP with the EUVE payload is on-orbit, having been launched with a Delta II
launch vehicle. The new payload and any mission specific equipment is launched on the Shuttle to a nominal 330
nmi, 28.5 ° inclined orbit where the EP is retrieved by the Shuttle RMS. The old payload is removed and stowed
on the FSS, and the new payload including any required MMS modules is installed.
The scenario assumes that the Flight Servicing system (FSS) is included in the Shuttle in order to stow servicing
modules during launch and recovery, and to provide a servicing platform from which servicing is performed.
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SHUTTLE/OMV BASED SERVICING SCENARIO
The Shuttle/OMV servicing scenario utilizes the OMV to transfer the new EP payload and mission specific
equipment to the nominal EP orbit. The OMV/servicer is assumed to be carried in the Shuttle bay with the
replacement payload to a nominal Shuttle orbit of 160 nmi. After separation from the Shuttle, the OMV performs
the orbit transfer and rendezvous with the EP. The servicer kit, which is derived from Satellite Servicing System
Program performs the necessary module replacements. The OMV then returns to, and is captured by the Shuttle
for stowage and return to Earth.
SHUTTLE/OMV BASED SERVICING SCENARIO
SPACE SYSTEMS/ i __._ J,._ • i..
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SHUTTLE/SPACE STATION FREEDOM BASED SERVICING
The Shuttle/SSF servicing scenario is a full implementation of the Space Transportation System (STS). The
regularly scheduled Shuttle launch to Space Station Freedom (SSF) will transport the replacement payload, MMS
modules, mission specific equipment, and propellant for the OMV. Payload handling, integration to the OMV, and
checkout will be performed at SSF prior to launch of the servicing mission. The servicing mission consists of an
optimized OMV transfer for rendezvous and docking with the EP, servicing of payload and required modules, and
return to SSF.
The big impact of servicing from the Space Station is the logistics impact of payload handling and checkout, and
integrating the payload to the OMV while on-orbit. The potential integration delay at the Space Station will quickly
increase the propellant mass for orbit transfer to the EP orbit. However, a Shuttle servicing mission would be
launched directly into the EP orbit.
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EXPENDABLE SERVICING SYSTEM (ESS) SCENARIO
The expendable servicing scenario utilizes the autonomous features of the ESS to perform the required payload
and module replacement. The ESS is launched into orbit with Delta II expendable launch vehicle. A significant
benefit of this scenario is the daily launch window availability from a ground launched system. An orbit transfer
from a space-based system is subject to significant waiting period between orbit nodal alignments. Any
unexpected delay using space-based assets will result in significant propellant penalty required to perform the
orbit transfer. A potential cost saving benefit also occurs from eliminating Shuttle and SSF related logistics
support.
The potential drawback of the expendable servicing scenario is that if a failure occurs, the mission success may
be compromised, and the expense of an entirely new servicing system or replacement platform will be required.
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GENERAL EP ASSUMPTIONS
The platform and experiment probability of success data was not available. In-house assumptions
were made. A P(s) of 0.92 was used for the EP bus at a 10 year mission life, and 0.96 was used for
the experiment at a 3.5 year mission life.
For Modelling purposes, the platform and cumulative experiment expected lifetimes were not equal.
The MMS has a 10 year design life, but not all of the experiments to fully utilize that capability have
been defined, so the model executed just a single experiment replacement. The experiment titled,
"Exp #2" is a simulation of the XTE payload, but no cost data was available, so a generic payload
was assumed. The assumption on costs for the Exp #2 was assumed to be 1.2 times the EUVE
experiment costs. Now, the implication of not modelling the Explorer Platform as a 10 year on-orbit
program will not effect the accuracy of the servicing versus expendable platform comparison. The
input to the SATCAV model only allows a single servicing mission definition. Therefore, the
expected lifetime for both experiments was selected to be 3.5 years. The system mission lifetime
ran for 7 years instead of 10 so that multiple servicing missions would not be triggered. The only
implication by this modelling assumption is that since the MMS has a 10 year design life, no failures
of the MMS would likely result.
The assumption was made, and accepted by MSFC, that the exclusion of Shuttle charges to NASA
programs, because they are considered secondary payloads, would not accurately compare the
servicing versus the expendable scenarios. This is mainly due to the fact, that most expendable
satellites are launch on Expendable launch vehicles, and serviceable scenarios are serviced with
the STSo Therefore, to compare scenarios with consistency, Shuttle launch costs were included.
The chart to follow fully explains the Shuttle launch cost assumptions.
Some servicing versus expendable scenarios decrease the cost of the expendable satellite relative
to the servicing one to try and adjust for the fact that a serviceable satellite is 10%-15% more costly
to design and build. That assumption was not used for EP because MMS is an existing design that
has flight history. The assumption was made that it would be more realistic of a comparison to
compare all options with a common satellite bus.
GENERAL EP ASSUMPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m--Imi_8_b, i--- m
The experiment expected lifetime is 3.5 years
A four year engineering development period prior to launch
Delta II launch Vehicle for initial EP placement and expendable
servicing mnssnons
EP spacecraft bus reliability 0.92 with a 10 year expected lifetime
EUVE and Exp #2 reliability of 0.96 with a 4 year expected lifetime
The NR and R cost of Exp #2 is 1.2 times that of EUVE
The Shuttle launch charges are based on a sliding scale based on
launch weight relative to launch capacity to orbit. The secondary
payload approach is not considered
The baseline EP is used for all servicing options. No platform
discounting is applied, even for the expendable platform scenario.
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SHUTTLE LAUNCH COSTS
The methodology for generating Shuttle launch costs can be quite ambiguous, and one gets a
different answer depending who answers the question. A typical method uses the payload weight
and length occupied in the Shuttle bay to establish a percentage of the total launch cost. If the
weight (which includes cradles and supports) is a higher percentage of the total than the length
component, then the cost is based on weight instead of length. And similarly, the cost is based
on the length if the percentage occupied is greater than the weight component. Additionally, if
the percentage utilized is not greater than 75% of the Shuttle capacity (either weight or length,
which is bigger) then a manifest charge, typically 33% of the payload launch cost, is added.
The individual NASA program offices do not recognize this cost as applied to their respective
programs. They consider their manifest on the Shuttle as a secondary payload. In other words,
they occupy excess Shuttle capacity, and therefore, the launch costs are not applied to their
budget.
If this study adopted such an approach, the real cost comparison would be skewed to promote
Shuttle-based servicing in all but polar orbits. Therefore, Shuttle launch charges using the
methodology described above is used to generate a true cost comparison for the different
servicing scenarios.
The baseline ground rule used to estimate Shuttle costs is based on a charge of $208M to launch
56K Ibs to a nominal orbit of 160 nm, 28.5 ° inclination. This results in a $3714 per pound. Then
for the various missions, a table look-up is used to determine the capacity for other than 160 nmi
altitudes orbits. Then a new dollar-per-pound factor is determined. The 33% manifest charge is
included for all EP Shuttle launches since the weight and length of the payload do not represent
over 75% of the Shuttle capacity.
The weight estimates for all cradle and manifest weights were obtained from David Douds,
GSFC.
:i.i:,__,
SHUTTLE LAUNCH COSTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ _lmi_d_.m-... i
PROGRAM LAUNCH
Explorer Platform Servicing
Mission
• FSS, Shuttle In-situ
Explorer Platform Servicing
Mission
• Shuttle/OMV
EP Servicing Mission
• Shuttle / SSF
ALTITUDE
NM
330
160
240
MANIFEST
PAYLOAD
(LB)
55OO
WEIGHT
CRADLE
(LB)
10,900
$/LB
4,643
MANIFEST
CHARGE
%
33
18,000
11,950
5,000
8,400
3,714
4,020
33
33
SHUTTLE
LAUNCH
COST ($M)
101.3
113.6
109
1,51
EXPLORER PLATFORM SATCAV INPUT COSTS
The input data for the EP has been acquired from two sources. Rudd Moe, Satellite Servicing Manager, GSFC,
supplied the nonrecurring and recurring data for the MMS modules and the EUVE payload. Saroj Patel, MSFC
supplied the remaining data. The data was converted into FY89 dollars. It was assumed for experiment #2 that
the nonrecurring and recurring cost would be increased by 20% over the EUVE payload.
For all of the serviced and non-serviced scenarios, the same platform and platform costs are assumed. This is
consistent with the philosophy that whether the platform is expendable or serviceable the same platform, as
currently designed, would be used. Therefore, the same launch vehicle would also be used for initial placement
of the platform. This reduces the cost comparison to the cost of the servicing mission and related launch costs
relative to the platform replacement costs.
EXPLORER PLATFORM SATCAV INPUT COSTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __ • m
EXPLORER PLA TFORM
EUVE
NON RECURRING QTY
68.4 1
RECURRING
28.5
MMS 18.4 1 69.5
6.5
4.5
7.4
MACS
MPS
C&DH
SOLAR ARRAY & SADA
STRUCTURE
ODC
PROPULSION
TDRSS ANTENNA
FLT SOFTWARE
MISSION EQ DECK
12.2
8.4
13.1
6.3
11.2
3.4
5.1
4.0
3.6
2.2
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EXPLORER PLATFORM SATCAV INPUT COSTS (cont)
The following chart itemizes the major recurring cost inputs to the SATCAV model. In the expendable EP case, a
replacement platform and payload is launched instead of servicing. It was assumed that for all repair scenarios
that one MMS module (C&DH) would be replaced. The C&DH was assumed since tape recorders have a limited
lifetime.
The Flight Support System (FSS) consists of three cradles which serves as an on-orbit servicing platform and
provides mechanical and electrical interfaces between the EP and the shuttle. The FSS and launch support costs
were acquired from S. Patel, MSFC. The FSS is utilized only for in-situ Shuttle based servicing scenario. In the
Shuttle/OMV servicing case, it was assumed that the servicing modules would be stored on the servicer which is
integrated to the OMV on the ground. In the SSF servicing scenario, the servicing payload is transported as
cargo in the Shuttle to the space station.
The servicer and OMV costs were based on standard SSS and OMV user charges of $5M and $6M, respectively.
The ESS servicer costs were derived from an internal study to develop a mission specific servicer. The $20M
recurring cost and $7M NR assumes the design could draw on key technologies from previous programs such as
the FTS, SSS, and OMV.
Space Station user fees were derived from in-space service and labor task estimating parameters obtained from
S. Patel, MSFC. These charges include on-board EPS, DMS, Comm, astronaut services for up to 10 days, and
SSF storage for up to 30 days.
Crew training costs assume such items as planning, procedures, and crew activity planning of personal and
facilities. Also included, is mock-up, simulator design and construction costs required to adequately train the
astronauts.
EXPLORER PLATFORM SATCAV INPUT COSTS (cont)
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • -__ • m
SERVICING COSTS EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5
EXPERIMENT #2
EXPLORER PLATFORM
C&DH MODULE
FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM
FSS LAUNCH SUPPORT
USER GSE
SERVICER USER FEE
OMV USER FEE
CREW TRAINING
RMS/EVA
SPACE STATION USER FEE
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EP BASELINE LCC SUMMARY
The following chart summarizes the LCC results for all expendable and serviceable scenarios. The total
discounted LCC ranged from $409M for the ESS servicing scenario to $455M for the Space Station based
servicing. The expendable servicer system (ESS) was the most cost effective from a bottom line cost stand-point.
However, it was only 3.5% better than the expendable scenario, and 4.9% better than Shuttle-based servicing
scenario. The level of confidence in this result cannot be very convincing due to the maturity of the cost inputs for
a program (ESS) that is not very well defined. A more fundamental observation for the ESS scenario is the
drastic difference in servicing system launch costs (ie. Delta II versus the Shuttle launch).
Typically, these studies use a 10% confidence threshold of the difference in total LCC to make conclusive
comparisons. Such a comparison can be made for ESS versus the servicing scenario utilizing the space station
The total differential LCC is $46M, and the 10% threshold is $41M-$45M; therefore, SSF-based servicing would
not be cost effective relative to expendable servicing. However, the results of the other scenarios are to close to
make conclusive recommendations.
A parametric method has been performed to extract useful trends relating to different servicing scenarios. The
results of which are presented at the end of this section.
The output data indicate that 2.5 platforms are required for the expendable scenario, and that 1.1 platforms/1.3
servicing missions are required to maximize the overall availability over the 7 year mission lifetime. The
interpretation of the number of platform or servicing mission, as shown below, is the modelling implementation of
spreading the costs of a new platform or servicers. No modelling techniques are incorporated to stop the
implementation of a new platform or servicer near end-of-life if a failure occurs., if a failure does occur near the
end of the mission lifetime, then a percentage of the replacement cost is spread over the remaining mission
years.
EP BASELINE LCC RESULTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/
INPUT DATA
Satellite Sat Launch Repair
Cost Cost Cost
($M) ($M) ($M)
Servicing
Launch Costs
($M)
L, II_..A_kk
OUTPUT DATA
Discounted # # Repair
LCC SAT Missions
EP 1 98 55 N/A N/A 424 2.5 0
(Exp)
EP 2 98 55 63.7 101.3 430 1.1 1.3
(Shuttle)
EP 3 98 55 66.5 113.6 447 1.1 1.3
(Shuttle/OMV)
EP 4 98 55 76.0 109 455 1.1 1.3
(Shuttle/SSF)
EP 5 98 55 71 55 409 1.1 1.4
(Exp. Servicer)
The Expendable servicer demonstrated the lowest LCC
However, scenarios EP1 and EP2 and EP5 were all within 5%, which is
below the established 10% confidence factor
m
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EP LCC COST COMPONENT
The following bar chart itemizes the undiscounted LCC components for each of the 5 scenarios. As expected, the
S/C costs for the expendable scenario are approximately double the servicing scenarios. The servicing costs for
the ESS are the highest because the servicer cost represents the entire recurring cost, were as only user fees,
significantly below the recurring cost, are assumed for the STS-based servicing options.
A slightly misleading observation could be made from this chart. It looks as if Shuttle/OMV-based and SSF-based
servicing missions are much more cost effective than the other scenarios. This is not a correct observation
because due to the modelling of the different phases of these servicing options, some of the servicing mission
costs were included as a launch to orbit cost. And therefore, are totaled as a launch cost. This is clearly
observed as the launch costs for these two options are significantly higher than the Shuttle-based servicing
option.
The nonrecurring costs are nearly identical for all but the ESS scenario. This is true for the first four options
because the identical MMS and experiments were assumed for each case. The added nonrecurring in the ESS
case is due to the development costs of the expendable servicer.
The Rec O&E are the necessary expenditures for continuing engineering and on-orbit ground control of the
platform.
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EP LCC COST COMPONENT (cont)
The LCC costs for the EP Expendable scenario spanned 11 years; 4 years of development, and 7 years of active
on-orbit performance. Although the MMS has a design life of 10 years, only two payloads missions were
assumed for the servicing scenarios. Therefore, to remain consistent, the SATCAV model mission life parameter
was 7 years for all EP cases.
If a failure occurred during launch, a new platform was launched. If a payload or platform failure occurred, a
servicing mission would be initiated, if serviceable, to maintain system availability. The serviceable platform
assumed a 90% factor for a successful servicing mission. No degradation of that factor was assumed after a
successful servicing mission. If the platform could not be serviced, then a new platform would be launched. The
stocastic nature of the model would simulate a failure through the Monte Carlo simulation and then the input cost
spreading function would spread that cost over the preceding years.
The SATCAV model does not have the flexibility to null out a servicing mission near the end of mission life. For
example, if a failure occurred 6 months before the second experiment was to be launched, the EUVE payload
would be serviced and 6 months later the new experiment mission would be initiated. The only way to try and
overcome this is to bump-up the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) parameter so that no failure occurs prior to
experiment replacement. Therefore, the MTTF for the experiment and the platform was set at 99 years and 120
years, respectively.
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EP PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS INPUT PARAMETERS
The following chart shows the 4 parametric studies for the Expendable, Shuttle based, and Expendable servicer
mission scenarios. It was felt that these 3 cases would adequately indicate the cost savings trends of servicing
versus replacement platforms. The reliability parametric was not performed because no data was available in the
baseline cases, and therefore, no data point existed from which accurate parametrics could be performed.
The WTR pad modification costs have been removed in the parametric study. This was mentioned in the
baseline input section as a controversial cost. Although it was included in the baseline results, it has been
removed in the parametrics.
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EP PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS INPUT PARAMETERS
SPACE SYS_MS/ • _F-__ • I
PARAMETRIC
CASES
EP 1 (Expendable)
EP 2 (Shuttle Based)
EP 5 (ExpServicer)
PARAMETRIC 1
SATELLITE COST
PAYLOAD
NR R
_+25% -+25%
_+25% _+25%
+-25% -+25%
REPAIR KIT
NR R
-+25% +.25%
+.25% .+25%
PARAMETRIC 2
RELIABILITY
PARAMETRIC 3
SERVICER SYS. COST
SERV KIT
NR R
.... +.25%
SENSOR BUS
MTTF MTTF
.+25_ _+25%
Serv
LAUNCHCSTT-3
HR
PARAMETRIC 4
LAUNCH COST
NR
R NR
RECURRING
T-1 T-3
+-20% .....
_+20% +.20%
+-20% +-20%
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EP SERVICER COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of repair kit cost on the relative economic benefits of
servicing. The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding
expendable spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement
spacecraft scenario is the most cost effective.
The plot shows that servicing is marginally cost effective for the Expendable Servicing System (ESS), with a
break even servicer cost of approximately $80M. The baseline servicer cost for ESS was $54M. The break even
point for Shuttle based servicing is much lower than the ESS case, approximately $50M. The primary reason is
the much higher Shuttle launch costs which significantly impact the total LCC.
EP SERVICER COST PARAMETRIC
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Differential LCC benefits for each of the servicing options are
shown as a function of EP servicing kit recurring cost by varying
both the nonrecurring and recurring costs
The ESS servicing option shows LCC savings benefits over the
expendable scenario for servicing kit costs below $80M
Shuttle based servicing becomes cost effective over the
expendable scenario when servicing kit costs are below $50M.
The lower slope STS curve results from fact that launch costs
represent a higher percentage of the total LCC than the ESS case
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EP SPACECRAFT PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of satellite cost on the relative economic benefits of servicing.
The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding expendable
spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement spacecraft
scenario is the most cost effective.
The plot shows that servicing is marginally cost effective for the ESS and increases slightly with increasing
satellite cost. The STS servicing mission is not cost effective until the satellite cost increases to over $122M. The
baseline EP cost is $98M.
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• This chart shows the Differential LCC cost variations versus spacecraft
recurring cost by varying the NR and R data for both the spacecraft
and servicer
• The trend of chart indicates that as the spacecraft R cost increase, the
potential benefits of servicing increase. Even though the servicer
costs are also increasing with spacecraft costs, this trend is valid
when the spacecraft replacement costs are much greater than the
servicing kit costs
• The greater the difference between the spacecraft replacement and
servicer kit costs, the steeper the slope of the curve.
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EP LAUNCH COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of launch cost variation on the relative economic benefits of
servicing. The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding
expendable spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement
spacecraft scenario is the most cost effective.
The plot shows that launch costs have no relative LCC impact on the ESS. This is not a significant result. It
appears constant because the ESS and the Expendable EP scenarios both utilize the same launch vehicle.
Thus, a launch cost percentage change in both scenarios results in no relative difference. However, a launch
cost percentage change in the Shuttle costs versus the expendable scenario will result in a marginal change in
LCC, as shown below. When the Shuttle costs are decreased by 15%, the break even point in relative LCC is
reached.
EP LAUNCH COST PARAMETRIC
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• Differential LCC is the expendable minus the serviceable case
• ESS is constant because both the Expendable and the ESS assume the
Delta II launch vehicle
• A servicing option benefit using the Shuttle is observed for launch costs
below 85% of nominal, or $85M
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EXPLORER PLATFORM SUMMARY
The expendable servicer system (ESS) was the most cost effective from a bottom line cost
stand-point. However, it was only 3.5% better than the expendable scenario, and 4.9% better than
Shuttle-based servicing scenario. The level of confidence in this result cannot be very convincing due
to the maturity of the cost inputs for a program (ESS) that is not very well defined. A more
fundamental observation for the ESS scenario is the drastic difference in servicing system launch
costs (ie. Delta II versus the Shuttle launch).
Typically, these studies use a 10% confidence threshold of the difference in total LCC to make
conclusive comparisons. Such a comparison can be made for ESS versus the servicing scenario
utilizing the space station. The total differential LCC is $46M, and the 10% threshold is $41M-$45M;
therefore, SSF-based servicing would not be cost effective relative to expendable servicing° However,
the results of the other scenarios are to close to make conclusive recommendations.
The parametric analysis generated some important, but not terribly surprising trends. It was shown
that as servicer costs decreased, the benefit of servicing increased. They also showed that as the
platform cost increased, the benefit of servicing increased. The launch cost parametric indicated that
if the Shuttle launch costs could be reduced by 15%, then a break even point for Shuttle-based
servicing would occur relative to the expendable platform.
Although it was stated that no conclusive recommendations could be made to rank the top three
scenarios, the parametrics do allude to a few important observations. First, with the current Shuttle
costs it is almost impractical to achieve a 10% servicing benefit over the expendable scenario. And
second, the only reason that the ESS trends are so encouraging over the Shuttle-based servicing
option, is because of the launch cost disparity. So although the parametric trends indicate where the
break even points appear, the value of the Shuttle launch costs are the single most influential factor as
to how the results appear.
EXPLORER PLATFORM SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ l.__L.-
The total LCC for all the EP scenarios ranged between $409M and
$455M, a 10.6% difference. The 3 most cost effective scenarios were
within $21M; the Expendable servicer ($409), the Expendable platform
($424M), and the Shuttle based servicer ($430M).
The results do not indicate a clear advantage for either the servicing or
expendable scenarios. However, the data supports the conclusion that
SSF-based servicing is not cost effective, and has a much higher
probability of increased costs if on-station delays occur.
The SATCAV model results are highly dependent on reliability data to
estimate failure probabilities. Since no data was available, the
accuracy of the results is suspect. However, the relative difference is
still representative since most of the same hardware was assumed for
all mission scenarios.
The parametric study trends indicate that as repair kit and launch costs
are reduced, the benefit of servicing the platform increases. And as
the total spacecraft system cost increases, the benefit of servicing also
increases, as long as the servicing kit costs are significantly lower than
spacecraft replacement cost.
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AXAF, POP, EP SUMMARY
The following chart summarizes the satellite, servicer, and total LCC for the most cost effective servicing option
for each of the DRMs analyzed.
The EP/ESS scenario utilizes the autonomous features of an envisioned expendable servicer to perform the
required payload and module replacement necessary to service the platform. The ESS is launched into orbit with
Delta II expendable launch vehicle. The platform cost of $98M includes the MMS, EUVE payload, and mission
specific equipment. The servicer cost of $71M includes an XTE similar payload (assumed at 1.2 times the cost of
EUVE), a replacement C&DH MMS module, and expendable servicer. A total LCC for one platform and two
experiments over a 7 year mission life is $409M.
The POP/Robotic Exchange servicing scenario also utilizes and expendable servicer to rendezvous and dock with
the platform, however, a reuseable robotic system is transported to the platform on the first servicing mission and
is stored on the platform for future ORU robotic replacement. The service carrier undocks from the platform with
the old sensors, and maneuvers to a disposal orbit. The platform cost of $735M includes $299M for the platform
bus with integration, $300M for the science payload, and $100M for payload integration to the platform.
AXAF, POP, EP SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ _li__ I m
PROGRAM
AXAF
(ESS)
EP
(ESS)
POP
(Robotic Exch.)
Satellite
Cost ($M)
525
98 •
734
Servicer
Cost ($i)
319
71
500
LCC
Cost ($M)
1938
409
3502
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NEW DRM COMPARISON TREND
This summary chart comparing the three DRMs is an attempt to quantify a parameter that will be
representative of new servicing missions. In sifting through the mass of data that this study
generated, we felt that the ratio of servicer with launch costs to replacement satellite with launch
costs captured the most influential parameters of a typical servicing mission. The differential LCC
cost is the difference between the serviced spacecraft LCC and the unserviced spacecraft LCC.
The data points for each DRM represent the scenario of greatest servicing benefit. In the case of
the POP, two cases are shown since the baseline cases did not show any servicing benefits. The
modified POP scenario represents a servicing mission in which not all of the science payload is
replaced. For more detail see the POP parametric section.
The chart indicates that for systems with ratio value of less than 80% a servicing benefit exists. The
lower the percentage of servicer to replacement cost, including launch costs, the greater the
potential servicing benefit.
An attempt was made to expand this chart to include data from task 1. Although the overall trend
was consistent with the new DRMs, the scatter in the data was quite large.
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SSES SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ Ll_i_d_.m--- -_-
Task 1 reviewed 14 old NASA servicing studies, and analyzed them with a
common set of servicing and economic parameters.
- The average savings in life cycle cost due to servicing is 19.6%.
- The results of the 1989 analysis track previous results, thus validating the
SATCAV model for new DRMs.
Task .2 and Task 3 defined 3 DRMs: AXAF, EP, and POP. Each DRM
examnned the Expendable satellite versus Expendable Servicing, Shuttle
Servicing and SSF Servicing. Shuttle servicing to polar orbit for the POP
was not an option.
- The data supports the conclusion that SSF-based servicing is not cost
effective.
- The servicing window of opportunity from SSF is small, and the waiting
period before nodal alignment is large. This results in longer lead time
planning to ensure window of opportunity is not missed, thus increasing
servicing related costs.
- Shuttle launch costs, as calculated, were significantly higher than the
corresponding expendable launch vehicle. This factor greatly reduced any
potential servicing benefits.
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SSES SUMMARY (con't)
SPACE SYSTEMS/ Ll_d_.t-
DRM RESULTS
• AXAF:
- All of the considered servicing scenarios showed to be cost effective
over the expendable AXAF scenario. The expendable servicing system
resulted in the lowest LCC
POP
- Platform servicing was not cost effective if total payload replacement is
a requirement. A modified servicing strategy was defined to investigate
when POP servicing would be cost effective.
EP
- The Expendable servicer demonstrated the lowest LCC. However, the
Expendable servicer, Shuttle based servicer (FSS), and the expendable
satellite scenarios were all within 5% in total LCC.
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FUTURE STUDY OPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __--.--_ •
The method of treating failures in a multi-purpose spacecraft
can be treated in two ways. Either a system level reliability
number can be used, or the SATCAV model has the capability
to input a multi-payload set and track the failures of each. The
present study incorporated the simpler method, but a more
detailed analysis could be used in two ways.
A)
B)
It could be used to help define a servicing strategy for a
multi payload system. Since each payload would input
its specific expected lifetime and failure probabilities, a
time history of predicted failures and overall system
availability could be tracked.
Another useful characteristic of this analysis is to
generate sets of specific servicing strategies. This is
based on payload priorities, or perceived priorities. For
example, reliability data is input for each payload (or
even payload subsy.stems), then a matrix is created to
specify what combination of payload failures should
trigger a servicing mission. By running a few different
failure combinations and comparing this with the
associated LCC, a powerful payload discriminator
parametric has been generated.
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FUTUR STUDY OPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L-Imi_.._. l- i
The Reliability Parametric demonstrated that a unique combination
of redundancy and servicing will result in the lowest LCC.
However, the analysis to estimate the reliability and associated
spacecraft and servicer costs could be improved and expanded
upon. This results could be further parameterized tO show the
se.ns!tivity as a function of various subsystems. The servicing
m=ss=ons could also be parameterized and plotted together with
the reliability data to indicate a set of optimal solutions for each
redundancy scenario.
New DRMs can be run or modifications to existing DRMs can be
made. We feel that we understand our processes quite well and
have now developed good communications with the NASA to
obtain needed information. Therefore, we estimate over a 50%
learning curve could be applied to subsequent analysis.
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Previous studies have shown that satellite servicing is cost effective
however, all of these studies were of different formats, dollar year,
learning rates, availability, etc. Therefore, it was difficult to
correlate any useful trends from these studies. This study was
initiated to correlate the economic data from our studies into a
common data base, using a common set of assumptions. A selected set
of existing funded programs were then analyzed to provide an
independent analysis of the servicing options and potenti_l economic
benefits.
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